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MAINE LAW REVIEW
JUDGES, RACISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF ACTUAL
INNOCENCE
Honorable Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr. *
"That Justice is a blind goddess
Is a thing to which we black are wise
Her bandage hides two festering sores
That once perhaps were eyes."
LANGSTON HUGHES, Justice
in THE COLLECTED POEMS OF
LANGSTON HUGHES
"The most difficult and urgent challenge
today is that of creatively exploring new
terrains of justice, where the prison no
longer serves as our anchor."
ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE?
I. INTRODUCTION
The facts and data are in and the conclusion they compel is bleak: the Ameri-
can criminal justice system and its showpiece, the criminal trial, harbor at their
core a systemic racism. For decades, criminologists, law professors, sociologists,
government statisticians, and others have been collecting and collating data on
crime, punishment, and incarceration in the United States. These intrepid scholars
have looked at crime, criminals, and the justice system from all angles-the race
of defendants and victims; the relationship of poverty to criminality; severity of
crime; severity of punishment; incarceration rates for different racial groups; sen-
tencing and sentence disparities; and so on. 1 When this information, reflecting
* Associate Justice, Rhode Island Superior Court. I am grateful to my colleagues on the
Rhode Island Superior Court, Edward C. Clifton, Stephen P. Nugent, and 0. Rogeriee Thomp-
son, for reading early drafts of this essay. Marshall Clement and Felicia Delgado also provided
helpful comments, for which I am thankful. Writing is a solitary endeavor, but research is often
a collective effort: I am in the debt of Kara Hoopis, Kara Thorvaldsen, Sam Karn, and McCall
S. Robertson for their research assistance. This essay develops remarks I presented at the Racial
Justice Colloquium of the Roger Williams University School of Law on May 11, 2004, and I
thank Dean David Logan and Liz Tobin Tyler, Associate Director of the Feinstein Institute for
Legal Service, for including me in the program. Naturally, observations about the criminal
justice system, as well as any errors, are mine alone.
1. See, e.g., ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA (1993); JEROME G. MILLER, SEARCH AND DESTROY: AFRICAN-AMERI-
CAN MALES IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1996); CHRISTIAN PARENTi, LocKDOWN AMERICA:
POLICE AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS (1999); RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME AND THE LAW
(1997); THE PUBLICASSAULT ON AMERICA'S CHILDREN: POVERTY, VIOLENCE, AND JUVENILE INJUSTICE
(Valerie Polakow, ed., 2000); MARC MAUER, RACE TO INCARCERATE (1999); KATHERYN K. RUSSELL,
THE COLOR OF CRIME: RACIAL HOAXES, WHITE FEAR, BLACK PROTECTIONISM, POLICE HARASSMENT,
AND OTHER MACROAGRESSIONS (1998); see also, Donna Coker, Foreword: Addressing the Real
World of Racial Injustice in the Criminal Justice System, 93 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 827
(2003); Sheri Lynn Johnson, Unconscious Racism and the Criminal Law, 73 CORNELL L. REV.
1017 (1988).
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thoughtful examinations of crime and incarceration statistics over forty years, is
combined with the results of recent investigations into the tragic phenomena of the
erroneous convictions of actually innocent people,2 it becomes apparent that some-
thing is drastically broken--especially relative to race-within our criminal jus-
tice system.
My purpose is not to marshal facts to prove that racism infects the criminal
justice system. However, for the interested reader, I will reference studies and
conclusions of writers and critics whose involvement with this topic has led them
to question, criticize, and-in some instances-reject the premises that legislators,
policy makers, and judges act upon when dealing with crime and putative crimi-
nals.
Among the reams of data collected and collated by researchers, one figure is
regularly cited but never impeached or dismissed: "46 percent of prison inmates
nationally are African-American, compared to their 12 percent share of the overall
population. ' ' 3 Connected with disproportionate incarceration rates for African-
Americans is the racial breakdown for probation and parole.4 "Nearly one in three
(32%) black males in the age group 20-29 is under some form of criminal justice
supervision on any given day-either in prison or jail, or on probation or parole." 5
The chance that a black male will avoid prison during his lifetime is slim; unlike
the generous odds a white male enjoys to dodge incarceration, a black male born in
1991 has a 29% chance of spending time in prison at some time in his life. The
figure for white males is 4%, and for Hispanics 16%.6 Young people of color fair
no better than their adult brothers and sisters. The United States Department of
Justice reported that in 1999, for example, "more than 6 in 10 juvenile offenders in
2. I use the term "actual innocence" to refer to those persons who were convicted of a crime
for which evidence later revealed they had no culpability. In a study released on April 19, 2004,
titled Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, Professor Samuel R. Gross of the
University of Michigan Law School and other researchers demonstrated that wrongful convic-
tions of the actually innocent disproportionately affected African-Americans. Samuel R. Gross
et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 through 2003, available at http:l/
www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/exonerations-in-US.pdf. See infra notes 16-36 and accom-
panying text. For general discussions of the problem of wrongful convictions of the actually
innocent, see the pioneering study, BARRY SCECK ET AL., ACTUAL INNOCENCE (2000). See also
STANLEY COHEN, THE WRONG MEN: AMERICA'S EPIDEMIC OF WRONGFUL DEATH Row CONVICTIONS
(2003); MARK FUHRMAN, DEATH AND JUSTICE: AN ExposP OF OKLAHOMA'S DEATH Row MACHINE
(2003). Erroneous convictions, of course, are nothing new. For an early cataloging and assess-
ment of this problem, see EDWIN BORCHARD, CONvICNG THE INNOCENT (1932).
3. MARK MAUER & THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACIAL DISPARITY AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYS-
TaM: AN ASSESSMENT OF CAUSES AND RESPONSES 4 (2003) (reporting figures from the Bureau of
Justice Statistics).
4. There are now more than 6.6 million people in the United States under "correctional
control." Richard D. Vogel, Capitalism and Incarceration Revisited, 55 MONTHLY Rv. 38, 43
(2003). Vogel culled this figure from the Bureau of Justice Statistics, United States Department
of Justice, the principal source of statistical information for most researchers looking at the
crime and punishment problem nationally. Id. at 44. Vogel was also able to determine that "only
35 percent of the probationers are black in contrast to prison populations where they makeup
almost 50 percent of all inmates." Id. at 45.
5. MARK MAUER, THE CRISIS OF THE YOUNG AFRICAN AMERICAN MALE AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 3 (April 1999), at www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/5022.pdf.
6. Vogel, supra note 4, at 45.
residential placement were minority youth." 7
A few more of the many statistical comparisons available will suffice to
chronicle the disproportionate harshness that the criminal justice system visits on
people of color compared to whites. Figures regarding incarceration rates-that
is, the number of persons sentenced per 100,000 residents in the group being stud-
ied-show that this problem will not abate any time soon. For example, in 1996,
for every 100,000 members of the black male population, 3,098 black men were
sent to jail, while for every 100,000 white males only 370 were locked up.8 For
Hispanics, the number of men incarcerated out of 100,000 was i,278. 9 With a
disparity in incarceration rates between blacks and whites of nearly ten to one, it is
unlikely that the disproportionate racial breakdown of the prison population and
parolees on the street will shrink unless significant changes in the criminal justice
system are implemented. A related figure is also telling: of the adults on probation
in the United States, 35% are black, a significant drop-off from the nearly 50% that
blacks represent in the imprisoned population. 10 This has led one student of the
problem to conclude: "These statistics indicate that it is almost as difficult for
white men to get into prison as it is for black men to stay out."11
The skeptic might say these figures simply reflect a benign and racially neu-
tral justice system going about its business, it being a fact of life that blacks com-
mit more crime and are therefore arrested and prosecuted more often. Some statis-
tical cohorts bolster this position, but it is a gross oversimplification. 12 I will
contend in this essay that the criminal justice system-and especially the criminal
trial-is structured to foredoom disproportionately large numbers of minority men
to incarceration at one or more times in their lives. I submit that at a number of
junctures in the criminal justice system, official conduct that is racist in conse-
quence, if not by design, enhances the likelihood of black men ending up behind
bars at a rate that is far disproportionate to that of whites.
The official posture of the bench and bar is that racism is not endemic to the
administration of criminal justice; and when isolated instances of racism occur, the
7. MELISSA SICKMUND, OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE AND DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, JUVENILES IN
CORRECTIONS 9 (June 2004), at http://www.ncjrs.org/pdffilesl/ojjdp/202885.pdf. Though the
document contains this statistic and many others equally distressing, Ms. Sickmund's superiors,
for undisclosed reasons, thought it necessary to conclude her report with a disclaimer: "Points
of view or opinions expressed in this document are those of the author and do not necessarily
represent the official position or policies of OJJDP [Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention] or the U.S. Department of Justice." Ms. Sickmund holds the title of Senior Re-
search Associate at the National Center for Juvenile Justice.
8. Vogel, supra note 4, at 44, tbl. 1.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 45.
11. Id.
12. For extended and thoughtful discussions that acknowledge the sad reality of crime within
the black community, especially black-on-black crimes of violence, but which also criticize a
criminal justice system marred by racism, see generally, KENNEDY, supra note t and RUSSELL,
supra note 1. See also Arthur H. Garrison, Disproportionate Minority Arrest: A Note on What
Has Been Said and How it Fits Together 23 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIVIL CONFINEMENT 29
(1997). For a lucid examination of why some members of the underclass turn their feelings of
worthlessness and impotence viz t) viz the dominant class into violent outbursts against each
other, see the famous polemic of the Algerian psychiatrist, FRANTZ FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE
EARTH (Presence Africaine 1963) (1961).
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system is well-equipped to root them out. So far as I know, there are no national
studies commissioned by bench or bar professional organizations that conclude
that the system has racist components, though some national and state studies re-
flect the not surprising fact that minorities have a more jaundiced view of the
possibility of obtaining justice then do whites. 13
Against this sanguine official line that all is well, racially-speaking, and that
when racism surfaces it is not a systemic phenomenon but rather the aberrational
behavior of a rogue judge, prosecutor, or other participant in the process, stand
stark figures demonstrating incontrovertibly that minorities are disproportionately
represented in police precinct lockups, criminal trials, and prisons. These baleful
statistics are not the product of chance. And only if one believes that the black or
Hispanic child lying in his maternity ward crib has congenital proclivities toward
crime and substance abuse not shared by the Caucasian baby in the next crib could
one conclude that the present state of affairs is not the result of systemic failures.
In this essay, I am not suggesting that the federal and state benches in this
country are stacked with racists, though I have no doubt such people are scattered
throughout the judiciary. Judges, after all, manifest many traits of their communi-
ties, and not all of these are healthy. Similarly, I am not arguing that most persons
accused of crimes are actually innocent or that blacks are less capable than whites
of committing heinous crimes. But this is not the point. The personal integrity and
good intentions of judges, attorneys, and jurors, forced as they are to operate in an
environment that compels deference to unfair and illogical practices, cannot en-
sure fair trials with just outcomes. It is some of these long-standing foundational
rules of criminal procedure and evidence that must be changed or nullified if
society's assault on minority communities through the vehicle of the justice sys-
tem is to be halted. 14
13. See NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS, How THE PUBLIC VIEWS THE STATE COURTS: A 1999
NATIONAL SURVEY 8 (1999) (noting that "[t]wo-thirds of African-Americans feel that 'people like
them' are treated somewhat or far worse than other people [by the judicial system]" and "[ailmost
70% of African-American respondents think that African-Americans, as a group, get 'Some-
what Worse' or 'Far Worse' treatment from the courts . . ."); Terry Carter, Divided Justice,
A.B.A. J., Feb. 1999, at 42, 42 (concluding that black lawyers perceive the justice system as
possessing more racial bias than white lawyers do; for instance, 52.4% of black lawyers sur-
veyed, as compared to 6.5% white lawyers, answered "very much" racial bias currently exists in
the judicial system); David B. Rottman & Alan J. Tomkins, Public Trust and Confidence in the
Courts: What Public Opinion Surveys Mean to Judges, CT. REV., Fall 1999, at 24, 27) (stating
"[s]tudies in sentencing and other criminal justice decision points do suggest African-Ameri-
cans are treated worse than other Americans. It is reasonable for African-Americans to presume
they are not being treated as well as others and to be inclined to extend that perception to the
treatment of minority groups generally.") (citations omitted); American Bar Association, Per-
ceptions of the U.S. Justice System, available at http://www.abanet.org/media/perception/
perception6.html ("It should be noted, however, that while overall confidence in the justice
system shows no consistent patterns based on race/ethnicity, specific attitudes toward the sys-
tem do vary between whites and non-whites, with whites holding more positive attitudes in
many areas, particularly those that relate to equality of treatment.") (emphasis in original omit-
ted); David B. Rottman & Randall M. Hansen, How Recent Court Users View the State Courts:
Perceptions of Whites, African-Americans, and Latinos, available at http://www.ncsconline.org/
DResearch/publications.html ("Generally African-Americans are the most critical and least
satisfied [with state courts].").
14. People involved in the judicial enterprise would do well to regularly reflect on an apho-
rism of Justice Holmes: "It is one of the misfortunes of the law that ideas become encysted in
phrases and thereafter for a long time cease to provoke further analysis." Hyde v. United States,
225 U.S. 347, 391 (1912) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
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We learn much about systemic racism from an examination of outcomes, those
final figures pertaining to arrests, sentencing, prison populations, and the racial
breakdowns under these rubrics. The figures, of course, are the result of the slow
unfolding of a protracted process, but informative as they are, they do not plainly
or completely disclose the "smoking gun" of racism within the courts. Numbers
cannot fully depict the systemic reality, but when they are analyzed within a com-
mon sense critique of the structural dynamic of the criminal trial, we can reach
conclusions about which we can be confident. 15
Draped like a cold, mildewed sheet over the raw figures of prison populations
and incarceration rates are the statistics and stories pertaining to exonerations of
actually innocent people, that is, people who were convicted of crimes for which
later evidence demonstrated they had no responsibility whatsoever. On April 19,
2004, Professor Samuel R. Gross of the University of Michigan Law School and
his team of researchers released a study titled Exonerations in the United States:
1989 through 2003,16 which collated data of 328 exonerations across the United
States during that period of time, "145 of them [having been] cleared by DNA, 183
by other sorts of evidence." 17 Professor Gross and his team reported on only
individual cases and labeled their figures "conservative" because they did not con-
sider mass exonerations such as those that occurred "in 1999-2000 in Los Angeles,
in the aftermath of the discovery of the Rampart area police scandal; and in 2003
in Tulia, Texas, when a single dishonest undercover officer was shown to have
framed 39 innocent drug defendants." 18
15. A leading commentator on the issue of race and crime, Jerome G. Miller, with long
experience as professor, researcher, political staffer, and correctional official, emphasizes that
as helpful as statistics are in describing institutional phenomena, they are not as important as the
narratives or "life-records" behind the numbers. For Miller, one cannot "lose sight of the com-
plex human tragedies that weave their way through the mundane labeling and processing we call
criminal justice." MILLER, supra note 1, at 145. A similar sentiment was expressed by Mr.
Justice Brennan in a bristling dissent directed at the five-justice majority. See McCleskey v.
Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 320 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority ignored statistical
evidence of race bias in a capital case even though they themselves found the statistics and
conclusions to be valid. See id. at 291 n.7. In words applicable to any examination of the impact
of race on the functioning of the criminal justice system, Mr. Justice Brennan wrote, "the evalu-
ation of evidence suggesting such a correlation [between skin color and a decision to impose the
death penalty] must be informed not merely by statistics, but by history and experience," Id. at
341 (Brennan, J., dissenting). To this I would add that we cannot lose sight of the narrative
observations uttered by judges, legislators, and policy makers in their often flawed and illogical
responses to the human tragedies importuning them for justice.
16. Samuel R. Gross et al., Exonerations in the United States: 1989 Through 2003, at http://
www.law.umich.edu/newsandinfo/exonerations-in-us.pdf (April 19, 2004) [hereinafter Gross].
Citations in this essay are to the Executive Summary of this study.
17. Id. at 1.
18. Id. Gross did not make any reference to the race of the individuals victimized by these
mass miscarriages, but newspaper accounts provide the not surprising information that they
were virtually all people of color. For example, in the Rampart scandal, after a pattern of police
perjury and frame-up was uncovered, 100 prisoners were released; the overwhelming majority
of these were Hispanic. Lou Cannon, One Bad Cop, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 1, 2000, § 6 (Magazine) at
632. In Tulia, a small town in northwest Texas, the fabrications of one police officer led to the
arrest on cocaine charges of "46 people, nearly all of them black"; some of them were serving
sentences up to twenty years at the time their wrongful conviction was revealed. CBSnews.com,
Targeted in Tulia, Texas? at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/09/26/60minutes
main57529l .shtml (July 4, 2004). Beginning on July 29, 2002, Bob Herbert wrote a series of
[Vol. 57:2
2005] JUDGES, RACISM, AND THE PROBLEM OF ACTUAL INNOCENCE 487
Among the tasks Gross set for the study was the identification of causes for
these egregious miscarriages of justice. The researchers determined that the prin-
cipal flaw leading to wrongful convictions was eye-witness misidentification.19
Following misidentification was perjury, sometimes by victims or confederates,
other times by police officers or government forensic scientists: 20 "[olverall, in
44% of all exonerations (145/328) at least one sort of perjury is reported .... 21
The Gross study is replete with information that should alarm even casual
observers of the criminal justice system, especially those with faith that the system
invariably reaches just results through fair procedures. But the findings and con-
clusions regarding the connection of race with false convictions demonstrate that
something more malevolent than chance is at work when a person of color con-
fronts an accusation of crime.
The study of rape and juvenile exonerees is especially revealing. By way of
background, Gross and his colleagues point out that in 2002, of all prisoners serv-
ing time for rape, 58% were white, "only 29% were black; and 13% were His-
panic;" 22 yet, an examination of the cases revealed that "for rape exonerations the
proportions are reversed: almost two-thirds of the defendants are black, 65%; only
27% are white; and 8% are Hispanic."'23 Most of the rape exonerations studied by
Gross resulted from DNA comparisons. In answering the question of why blacks
were "so greatly over-represented among those defendants who were falsely con-
victed of rape and then exonerated," the study concluded: "[t]he key is probably
the race of the victims."'24 In explaining how they reached this conclusion, the
researchers wrote:
We know the race of the victim for 75% of the 69 rape exonerations with black
defendants, and in 75% of those cases the victim was white .... Of all the
problems that plague the American system of criminal justice, few are as incen-
diary as the relationship between race and rape. Nobody would be surprised to
find that bias and discrimination continue to play a role in rape prosecutions.
Still, the most obvious explanation for this racial disparity is probably also the
most powerful: the perils of cross-racial identification. Virtually all of the inter-
racial rape convictions in our data were based, at least in part, on eyewitness
misidentifications, and one of the strongest findings of systematic studies of eye-
witness evidence is that white Americans are much more likely to mistake one
black person for another than to do the same for members of their own race. 25
columns in the New York Times documenting the Tulia scandal and exposing the flaws in the
criminal justice system that allowed it. See, e.g., Bob Herbert, Kafka in Tulia, N.Y. TiMES, July
29, 2002, at At9; Bob Herbert, 'Lawman of the Year,' N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 1, 2002, at A25; Bob
Herbert, Tulia's Shattered Lives, Aug. 5, 2002, at A15. On January 19, 2005, the New York
Times ran a squib announcing that Tom Coleman, the drug agent convicted of multiple counts of
perjury directed against the Tulia defendants, received a sentence of ten years on probation.
Steve Barnes, Texas: Ex-Narcotics Agent Gets Ten Years'Probation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 19, 2005,
at A14. To the extent that any judicial punishment sends a message, the one here is that official
misconduct of the most serious nature directed at minority defendants is a trifle not warranting
incarceration, much like lynching in the days of Jim Crow.
19. Gross, supra note 16, at 18.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 22.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 22-23 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
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Although confirming in so many words the observation of philosopher and
social critic Cornel West that "Americans are obsessed with sex and fearful of
black sexuality," 26 an empirical background fact that buttresses Gross' observa-
tion that racism is a factor in white-victim-black-assailant rape cases is that "[i]nter-
racial rape is uncommon, and rapes of white women by black men in particular
account for well under 10% of all rapes."'27
Though these statistics pertaining to rape exonerees reveal a skewed situation
when racial comparisons are made, the study's observations about juvenile
exonerees present a situation even more disturbing. After reviewing their 328
cases, the researchers were confronted with a stark fact: "[n]inety percent of exon-
erated defendants who were under 18 at the time of arrest were black or Hispanic.
There are virtually no non-Hispanic white juveniles among the defendants we have
studied-3 out of 328, less than 1% of the total."'28 Why is there such an extreme
gap in the figures based on race? The researchers submitted a conclusion:
In part, this disparity reflects general racial patterns in juvenile justice in America.
Many juveniles who are arrested are not prosecuted at all but returned to the
custody of their parents or guardians for less formal discipline; among those who
are prosecuted, only a small fraction are treated as adults and punished accord-
ingly. The juvenile exonerees in our data are all drawn from the small group of
juvenile suspects who are prosecuted as adults and sentenced to long terms in
prison-or, in 3 cases, to death. Race plays a major role at each stage of the
sorting process that produces this rarified group.29
To support its observations about race and the "sorting process," the research-
ers turned to FBI crime statistics:
[A]lthough only 27% of all juveniles arrested in the United States in 1990, 1992,
and 1994 were black, a Department of Justice study found that 41% of defen-
dants in juvenile courts in those three years were black, and 67% of juveniles
prosecuted as adults were black. In other words, white teenagers who are ar-
rested by the police are less likely than blacks to be prosecuted in juvenile court,
and much less likely to be prosecuted in felony court as adults.30
Other figures further bolster the proposition that race is an insidious factor in
the juvenile justice system. Conceding that chance could play a role because their
sample was small, the researchers had sufficient salient data to opt for an explana-
tion that focuses on racial disparity. Clearly, they observe, black juvenile rape
defendants "face a special danger of cross-racial misidentification"; and as to false
confessions resulting in erroneous convictions, "85% of the juvenile exonerees
who falsely confessed were African-Americans. '3 1
The researchers were not prepared to assert that their figures proved that po-
lice officers were "more likely to use coercive interrogation tactics on black juve-
26. CORNEL WEST, RACE MATTERS 119 (1994).
27. Gross, supra note 16, at 22-23. Gross notes that the figure is actually about "5 to 6%,"
according to his extrapolation from the BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SEX OFFENSES AND OFFEND-
ERS I1 (1997). Id. at 23, n.50.
28. Id. at 23.
29. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
30. Id. at 24-25.
31. Id. at 25.
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niles then on white juveniles," 32 and for this we can admire their scrupulosity as
empiricists. However, if we allow ourselves a bit of discursiveness and intuition
to reflect on the history of race relations in this country and the continuing de facto
segregation in housing, schools, segments of the work force, and TV ads (have you
ever seen an integrated couple pushing a product on a major network?), we can
conclude that a time in the police interrogation room for the black juvenile may be
more "instinct with coercion 33 than for a white one. Yet, despite their caution,
Professor Gross and his colleagues do not hedge on their ultimate conclusion:
The broad picture, however, is no mystery. We have a dual system of juvenile
justice in this country, one track for white adolescents, a separate and unequal
one for black adolescents. The sharp racial differences in exonerations of falsely
convicted juvenile defendants are just one manifestation of that racial divide. 34
There are several, incontjovertible facts to be drawn from meshing the data
about prison populations and incarceration rates generally with information about
exonerations in particular.
First, the criminal trial is not an infallible institution; and as a result of its
failings, "thousands, perhaps tens of thousands, '35 of actually innocent people
suffer behind bars. Second, a number of factors, none of them benign, coalesce to
put men of color at greater risk of serving jail time than white males, even in
circumstances where they are actually innocent. And lastly, with the exception of
the diligent lawyers, law students, journalists, and investigators who champion the
cause of the wrongfully convicted (and, of course, the thoughtful and honorable
judges who have heeded their petitions and acknowledged the system's grievous
mistakes), there are no system-wide attempts underway to implement substantive
reforms in the criminal trial in order to eradicate-or at least minimize-the prob-
lem of outcomes unduly influenced by considerations of race. 36
The figures I have cited thus far relate primarily to prisoners convicted and
incarcerated for so-called street crimes, principally drug offenses and larceny, as
well as crimes of violence. They do not reflect that other dimension of the crimi-
nal justice system that sheds additional light on the issue of race and justice, namely
the widespread existence of corporate crime, a species of white-collar crime that
symbolically reflects-albeit unintentionally-in its appellation the color of the
overwhelming majority of its practitioners. The gentle and genteel treatment by
prosecutors (with occasional notable exceptions) of corporate thieves, swindlers,
32. Id.
33. Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 549 (1968).
34. Gross, supra note 16, at 25. Even Congress, hardly a citadel of enlightenment regarding
race, crime, and incarceration, has noted the racial divide in the nation's juvenile justice system,
and accordingly has ordained that each year the Administrator of the Office of Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention submit a comprehensive report to Congress relative to the "rate at
which juveniles are taken into custody" and other pertinent factors such as "the race and gender
of the juveniles." 42 U.S.C. § 5617(l)(B) (2003).
35. Gross, supra note 16, at 26.
36. There have been some legislative enactments that have tentatively addressed the issue of
race as well as the problem of wrongful convictions. See, e.g., The Federal Juvenile and Delin-
quency Prevention Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5617(1)(B) (2003) (requiring custodial officials to keep
statistics regarding the race of juvenile detainees); see also The Innocence Protection Act of
2004, 18 U.S.C. § 3600 (2004) (representing a congressional attempt to allow convicts with
colorable claims of innocence grounded on DNA analysis to pursue them).
polluters, tax evaders, and hustlers is proof positive that there are two separate and
distinct criminal justice systems operating in this country. If one reads the Wall
Street Journal, the Financial Times, and the business section of the New York Times
as police blotters and docket sheets, the daily accounts of corporate transgressions
are staggering both in the scope of their predations on stockholders, consumers,
the environment, and public health as well as the comparatively mild sentences
and fines-sometimes civil and sometimes criminal-that are meted out.37 In a
meticulously researched study of corporate and street crime, and the diverse re-
sponses to each by politicians and law enforcement officials, George Winslow
estimates that "corporate crime now costs the economy $1 to $2 trillion a year
.... ,38 Not only do corporate criminals regularly avoid doing any hard time
37. 1 urge the reader to select at random any edition of these newspapers and read it with the
objective I recommend. For example, knowing that on the evening of November 16, 2004, I
would be a participant in a panel discussion on the reentry of prisoners into the community
sponsored by the Rhode Island Family Life Center and the Annie E. Casey Foundation, I brought
along a copy of the business section of that day's New York Times. A leading story focused on
the Boeing-Pentagon scandal and the criminal conduct of at least two officials, one an Air Force
employee and another the Chief Financial Officer of Boeing, who were charged with exchang-
ing favors and promises of future employment regarding contracts involving billions of dollars.
The story reported that Boeing executive Michael Sears "acknowledged that he secretly offered
ajob to an Air Force official, Darlene A. Druyun, while she was overseeing billions of dollars in
contracts and, by her admission, favoring Boeing. In April, she pleaded guilty and was sen-
tenced to nine months in prison." Tim Weiner, Ex-Boeing Financial Chief Pleads Guilty to
Felony, N.Y. Tims, Nov. 16, 2004, at C2. For his part, the New York Times reported, "Mr. Sears
is likely to receive six months in prison .. " Id. When the scheme involving both tax dollars
and national defense preparedness was uncovered, "Ms. Druyun ... was trying to channel tens
of billions of dollars of business to Boeing." Id. In an article on the same page, the Times
reported that the Securities & Exchange Commission had filed a civil suit against "two former
top executives of Hollinger International accusing them of bilking the newspaper company of
tens of billions of dollars and conspiring to conceal their dealings from shareholders and regula-
tors .. " Jacques Steinberg, S.E.C. Sues 2 Former Hollinger Executives, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16,
2004, at C2. Page C15 carried a short report that the S.E.C. is investigating Fannie Mae for
improper accounting: "Fannie Mae ... acknowledged that some of its accounting policies did
not comply with general accepted accounting principles." And on page CI, there was the saga
of the shareholders suit against Walt Disney relative to the "golden parachute" of $140 million
paid to Michael Ovitz, the former Disney president who departed after a year on the job with no
significant accomplishments to his credit. Laura M. Holson, Eisner On the Stand, Describes
Courting of Ovitz, N.Y. TiaEs, Nov. 16, 2004, at C1-4. These stories, and so many like them,
demonstrate that the nation's corporate environs are filled with numerous individuals who, by
way of criminal or civil misconduct, loot millions of dollars from other people, often degrading
the physical environment and the body politic while they are at it. Yet, the courts are parsimoni-
ous in imposing prison sentences or financial penalties proportionate to the transgressions. A
$50 million fine meted out to a multi-national corporation is a proverbial "drop in the bucket,"
and rarely causes a ripple in the daily functioning of the enterprise or its stock price. On the
other hand, the criminal justice system bludgeons the tapped-out small-time drug seller and
thief, tossing lengthy sentences around poor communities like confetti at a wedding.
38. GEORGE WINSLOW, CAPITAL CRIMES 7 (1999). Winslow reaches this figure by extrapolating
and projecting from data compiled by reputable groups. He references a 1974 estimate by the
United States Chamber of Commerce that put the economic cost of white-collar crime at $41
billion annually. Id. Winslow observes that for the decades following 1974, "many law-and-
order conservatives worked to limit spending to fight corporate crime, which is generally com-
mitted by large campaign contributors, as they were beefing up spending to fight street crime,
which is typically committed by poor people." Id. He then factors in the accomplishments of
the F.B.I. "In 1996, for example, F.B.I. investigations produced convictions in only two anti-
trust cases, one case involving workplace safety, thirty-five environmental cases, and just 148
cases of health fraud (which cost consumers $100 billion in inflated fees each year)." Id.
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behind prison walls, 39 their corporate employers and their colleagues in the execu-
tive suite are never prohibited from lobbying or making campaign contributions,
though the criminal justice system visits mass disenfranchisement on felons. 40
Any dispassionate examination of the disparate treatment of white-collar
crimes-even an abbreviated one-reveals the entanglement of race and class.
Everything I have encountered in both the scholarly and general literature shows
that people locked in our nation's jails and penitentiaries are disproportionately
men of color sent there for street crimes, while corporate criminals are overwhelming
white and rarely hear the prison door slam shut behind them. Clarence Darrow put
it well in words as pertinent today as when he offered them to the Cook County jail
inmates in 1902: "There is no very great danger of a rich man going to jail"; and
"few people comparatively go to jail except when they are hard up." 4 1
The volumes of data accumulated by government agencies, advocacy groups,
and individual scholars should penetrate the fog of official smugness to expose a
systemic racism that is a potentially lethal influence-if not the determining fac-
tor-in criminal trials involving minority defendants. This state of affairs is mor-
ally and constitutionally repugnant, but it need not exist. Some of the forces that
create this problem are external to the criminal justice system, and the criminal
justice system can offer few, if any, direct solutions. However, some of the prob-
lems that spawn racist outcomes are imbedded within the criminal justice system
itself and lend themselves to resolution by judges and other decision- makers within
the system. Still other problems manifest the intertwined relationship between
some sectors of the criminal justice system with the larger society's attitudes and
public policies. 42 As a result, the nature of a particular problem determines the
39. Scanning the Wall Street Journal, the Financial Times, and the business section of the
New York Times suggests that white corporate criminals are able to stay out of jail by the pay-
ment of large fines, be they criminal or civil; and needless to say, these dispositions are initiated
by prosecutors and approved by judges. As two careful students of the problem have observed:
"[p]olice do not typically initiate independent investigations of white-collar crime. In addition,
political pressures-at least before the business scandals of 2002-did not typically affect white-
collar sentences. For example, mandatory minimums are not generally attached to white-collar
crimes. Also, fines have an unusually prominent place in white-collar sentencing, and judges
have a good deal of discretion at the bottom of the fine table." Symposium, Disparities in
Sentencing-Race and Gender, 15 FED. SENTENcONG REP. 160, 161 (2003) [hereinafter Dispari-
ties in Sentencing] (summarizing research by Max M. Schanzenbach and Michael L. Yaeger (the
Schanzenbach-Yaeger study), titled Prison Time and Fines: Explaining Racial Disparities in
Sentencing for White-Collar Criminals (an unpublished manuscript in possession of author of
this essay)). The researchers reached one other conclusion that evidences another dimension of
bias: "they found that black offenders must pay larger fines in comparison to white offenders to
receive the same reduction in prison time." Id.
40. In 2002, I conducted library and internet research but could not locate any federal or state
statutes proscribing lobbying or campaign contributions by corporations as a result of the corpo-
ration or its officers being criminally convicted; and so far as I am aware, these circumstances
have not changed over the past two years. See Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Corporate Crime and
Voting Rights, DissEr, Summer 2002, at 56.
41. Clarence Darrow, Crime and Criminals: Address to the Prisoners in the Chicago Jail
(1902), at http://www.bopsecrets.org/CF/darrow.htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2005).
42. For example, many corporations and government bureaucracies have a monetary stake in
the continued existence of a large imprisoned population serving lengthy sentences, and they
have been able to enlist the support of politicians to create a growth industry for prison construc-
tion and management. Marc Mauer, one of the country's most astute students of incarceration,
has chronicled the problem:
feasibility of a judicial response to effectively eradicate it as a factor sustaining the
system's racism.
For example, a judge is strategically positioned in a criminal trial to exclude
prior convictions or evidence of prior uncharged bad acts, to allow expert testi-
mony on the pitfalls of cross-racial misidentification, and to instruct the jury that
proof beyond a reasonable doubt means proof to a mere certainty. More problem-
atic is the resolution of conflicting testimony regarding the seizure of evidence,
but a judge who is mindful of realities on the street-meaning everything from
joblessness and educational deficiencies to aggressive policing and racial profil-
ing-will be better able to see through some of the smoke screens that blow into
the courtroom. If a resolution of the conflicting stories does not clearly present
itself, the judge can remind himself or herself-as too few do-that, for example,
the burden of proof in a warrantless search situation rests with the prosecution
trying to justify the search.4 3
The entanglement of class and race with the criminal justice system cannot be
overstated nor can it be erased by judicial fiat. Grinding poverty and shattered
support systems mark the lives of the overwhelming majority of criminal defen-
dants and are the contributing causes of much of their behavior in the first place.
Minorities make up disproportionate numbers of the impoverished underclass, and
their plight has been widely documented, 44 albeit with few palliative responses
from the major political and corporate actors. Much of the data and analysis per-
taining to crime and prisons in this country would still be valid if we deleted refer-
ences to minorities and substituted the words "poor people" or "the impoverished
underclass." Class divides are manifested in the criminal justice system-and,
indeed, inhere in the way we criminalize some behavior while permitting other
activities that are not mala in se. But in this essay my principal points of refer-
ence are official actions and policies that disparately burden racial and ethnic
The more than 600,000 prison and jail guards, administrators, service workers, and
other personnel represent a potentially powerful political opposition to any scaling-
down of the system.... Prisons as sources of economic growth have also become
vital to the development strategy of many small rural communities that have lost jobs
in recent years but hold the lure of cheap land and a ready workforce.... Add to this
the rapidly expanding prison privatization movement focused on the "bottom line" of
profiting from imprisonment.
MAUER, supra note 1, at 10. See also, DAvis, supra note 1, at 84-104; Brent Staples, Why Some
Politicians Need Their Prisons to Stay Full, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A20.
43. See, e.g., Welch v. Wisconsin, 466 U.S. 740, 750 (1984) ("Before agents of the govern-
ment may invade the sanctity of the home, the burden is on the government to demonstrate
exigent circumstances that overcome the presumption of unreasonableness that attaches to all
warrantless home entries."); see also Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 61 (1970) (Harlan, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The 'general requirement that a search warrant be
obtained' is basic to the Amendment's protection of privacy, and 'the burden is on those seeking
[an] exemption... to show the need for it."') (alteration in original) (citations omitted); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967);
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367-68 (1964); United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51
(1951); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451,455-56 (1948); Agnello v. United States, 269
U.S. 20, 33 (1925).
44. See, e.g., CHUCK COLLINS ET AL., ECONOMIC APARTHEID IN AMERICA: A PRIMER ON ECONOMIC
INEQUALITY AND INSECURITY (2000); SHELDON DANZIGER & PETER GOTrSCHALK, AMERICA UNEQUAL
(1995); THOMAS FRANK, ONE MARKET UNDER GOD: EXTREME CAPITALISM, MARKET POPULISM, AND
THE END OF ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY (2000); JAMES K. GALBRAITHi, CREATED UNEQUAL (1998).
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minorities so as to disequilibrate the criminal trial: racial profiling, cross-racial
misidentification, aggressive policing in minority communities, higher arrest rates
for minority juveniles and their youthful acquisition of criminal records, etc. Judges,
of course, should not need any academic studies of poverty and class to tell them
about the complexion and status of the defendants who parade through their court-
rooms every day. Even in communities where the percentage of minorities is less
than the national average, the majority of the defendants will be poor, functionally
illiterate, and non-white.4 5
Judges may have theories and political philosophies about everything from
the maldistribution of wealth and resources in this country and the ludicrously low
poverty line defined by the government ($18,600 for a family of four), but we are
powerless as judges to do anything about it. We can, however, bring an awareness
of these problems into the courtroom. So with practical limitations in mind, it is
worth exploring what an alert judge with an informed conscience can do to con-
front racism in the criminal trial. I hasten to add that I am mindful that more than
90% of the criminal accusations lodged in this country are resolved by plea bar-
gains, but the fact that most prisoners end up behind bars without a trial does not
vitiate my criticisms. I submit that seasoned defense attorneys-whether mem-
bers of the private bar or public defenders' offices-and their clients are either
consciously aware of or intuit the problems and defects of the criminal trial I dis-
cuss in this essay, and they make their decisions within the shadows of these prob-
lematic realities.
II. BEGINNING WITH BATSON
Batson v. Kentucky46 gave minority criminal defendants a tool to use in thwart-
ing prosecutors' efforts to use peremptory challenges in eliminating from the jury
people of a race or ethnicity similar to the defendants. 47 This decision was grounded
in equal protection principles and sought not only to afford the defendant an op-
portunity to be tried by a cross-section of the community containing members of
his own race, but also to ensure that racial minorities were afforded a full opportu-
nity to serve on juries.48 The Batson rationale was later extended to gender,4 9
civil cases, 50 and white defendants. 5 1
Batson's purpose was laudable, but it is unlikely that in any voir dire either the
prosecution or the defense will be able to forecast the inclinations of black jurors
45. See DoRis J. JAMEs, U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROFILE OF JAIL
INMATES, 2002 (2004). For example, of the convicted inmates serving time in 2002, only 26.1%
had a high school diploma, while nearly 12% had not matriculated beyond the eighth grade. Id.
at 2, tbl. 1. Of those inmates who reported some employment prior to their arrest, approximately
60% were wallowing in poverty making less than $1,000 per month. Id. at 9, tbl.14. And
needless to say, "more than 6 in 10 persons in local jails in 2002 were racial or ethnic minorities,
unchanged from 1996." Id. at 1.
46. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
47. Id. at 84.
48. Id. at 99.
49. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994).
50. Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
51. See, e.g., Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992) (holding Batson applies to defen-
dants where the prosecutor made a Batson challenge to restrict white defendants from using
their peremptory challenges to strike potential black jurors).
MAINE LAW REVIEW
any more than they can of white. Nonetheless, Batson's principles serve as a pro-
phylactic to increase the odds that a defendant of color will encounter people on
his or her jury that may have similar cultural backgrounds and a familiarity with
the community from which the defendant comes.
But Batson also arrived with a built-in problem of implementation. In so
many words, the Supreme Court said that a prosecutor, upon being challenged that
he or she is exercising a peremptory challenge to eliminate a person of color from
the potential jury on the sole ground of race, must give the judge "a neutral expla-
nation" for the challenge. 5 2 At the same time, the Court also emphasized "that the
prosecutor's explanation need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a chal-
lenge for cause."53 It may be fairly asked where the domain lies between the
arbitrariness of a peremptory race-based challenge and a "for cause" challenge
grounded on the demonstrable basis of a juror's inability to be neutral and impar-
tial. The Supreme Court entrusted the answer to this question to the sound discre-
tion of the trial judge: "We decline, however, to formulate particular procedures to
be followed upon a defendant's timely objection to a prosecutor's challenges."'54
Appellate courts reviewing a trial record revealing "purposeful discrimination"
and devoid of an adequate "neutral explanation" for striking a minority juror must
reverse the conviction. 55
By allowing a "neutral explanation" that need not rise to the level of a "for
cause" challenge, the Supreme Court unwittingly sabotaged its stated concerns.
Nine years after Batson, in Purkett v. Elem,5 6 the Court sided with a federal trial
judge, and overturned the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, by approving a
prosecutor's "'race-neutral reason' for striking a black from prospective jury ser-
vice on the basis that the juror's long, unkempt hair, mustache and beard 'look
suspicious to me.' 57 In one of its more daring flights from reason, the United
States Supreme Court said: "What it means by a legitimate reason is not a reason
that makes sense, but a reason that does not deny equal protection. '58 The Court
went on to supply ammunition to those prosecutors and judges who have no seri-
ous commitment to eliminate racism from the criminal trial or to welcome all mem-
bers of the wider community into the governmental function of jury service: "The
prosecutor's proferred explanation in this case-that he struck juror number 22
because he had long, unkempt hair, a mustache and a beard-is race neutral and
satisfied the prosecution's step two ... burden of articulating a nondiscriminatory
reason for the strike." 59
52. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 97.
53. Id. In his concurring opinion in Batson, Mr. Justice Marshall signaled that intuitions or
hunches advanced by the prosecutor about a prospective minority juror's bias could mask pro-
scribed motives: "'seat-of-the-pants instincts' may often be just another term for racial preju-
dice." Id. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall went on to note that "[alny pros-
ecutor can easily assert facially neutral reasons for striking ajuror, and trial courts arc ill equipped
to second-guess those reasons." Id. See also Joshua E. Swift, Note, Batson 's Invidious Legacy:
Discriminatory Juror Exclusion and the "Intuitive" Preemptory Challenge, 78 CORNELL L. REv.
336 (1993).
54. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. at 99.
55. Id. at 100.
56. 514 U.S. 765 (1995).
57. Id. at 767.
58. Id. at 769 (citation omitted).
59. Id.
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In dissent, Justice Stevens chided the majority for rendering the opinion per
curiam and pointed out with tart delicacy that the Court had eviscerated Batson:
"Today the Court holds that it did not mean what it said in Batson."60 Justice
Stevens offered further criticism: "Today, without argument, the Court replaces
the Batson standard with the surprising announcement that any neutral explana-
tion, no matter how 'implausible or fantastic,' even if it is 'silly or superstitious,' is
sufficient to rebut a prima facie case of discrimination. '61
Even without the imprimatur of Purkett v. Elem, some trial courts have al-
lowed, with the later approval of appellate courts, explanations as patently frivo-
lous as a prosecutor's representation that hostility toward the state on the part of a
juror can be discerned from "body motion and eye contact."'62 Using the rationale
(such as it is) of Purkett v. Elem, but without any specific reference to that deci-
sion, the Supreme Court of Illinois in People v. Easley declared that "[d]emeanor
constitutes a legitimate race-neutral reason for exercising a peremptory challenge,"
while acknowledging that such "explanations must be closely scrutinized."'63 The
same court found no problem in allowing prosecutors to exclude a black person
from jury service on the basis of a revelation that his "neighborhood had experi-
enced street gang activity."64 The court stated that "Illinois courts have allowed
the State to exclude a venireperson if he or she lives in an area that has experienced
gang activity." 65 The Supreme Court of Illinois was unmoved by the differing
view of the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit which had
opined that "'[a]llowing the exclusion of black venirepersons simply because their
home or place of work is in a gang area has an enormous potential to dispropor-
tionately exclude black jurors in most cases involving black gang members.'"66
The Easley court subscribes to the prevailing notion that only a showing of an
actual intent to discriminate on the part of the prosecutor is sufficient to place the
State's attorney outside the strictures of Batson. The demand that this burden be
satisfied by the defense in the few minutes allotted for a Batson hearing during the
voir dire forecasts inevitable failure.
Apart from these excursions into the twilight zone where a glance or a gri-
mace can signal a disqualifying lack of impartiality, there are structural problems
in our system of jury selection that could-and should-be adjusted to further the
60. Id. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at 775 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted).
62. See, e.g., State v. Holley, 604 A.2d 772, 778 (R.I. 1992). In Holley, a prosecutor was able
to satisfy the Batson "neutral explanation" requirement by articulating his concern to the trial
judge about "[the prospective juror's] demeanor and his ability to follow ... instructions regard-
ing the standard of proof." Id. (citations omitted). The Rhode Island Supreme Court sustained
the removal of the minority juror, reasoning that it was appropriate for the prosecutor to rely on
"body motion and eye contact." Id.
63. People v. Easley, 736 N.E.2d 975, 990 (Ill. 2000).
64. Id. at 989.
65. Id.
66. Id. (quoting Williams v. Chrans, 957 F.2d 487, 489-90 (7th Cir. 1992)).
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goals of Batson.67 For instance, alternates are regularly designated at the same
time the entire jury is being selected; and of course, the alternates will not be
called upon to serve as jurors unless one of the jury slots is vacated because of
sickness or other indisposition. The problem arises if the so-called luck of the
draw results in a person of color being chosen as an alternate while the jurors
selected to serve are white. Absent any later developments resulting in the excusal
of a juror, this scenario must be labeled a lost opportunity to place a person of color
on the jury.
The problem could be eliminated if we abandon the practice of designating
jurors as alternates at the beginning of the trial. For example, if out of the general
panel of fifty people, fourteen are put in the box and two of these are persons of
color, the alternates could be designated after final arguments but immediately
prior to deliberations. In selecting the final twelve, the two minority names could
be put aside by the clerk and not exposed to the random spin of a barrel or any
other lottery mechanism employed to determine which two will become alternates.
This may appear to be a form of affirmative action when viewed from the point of
view of prospective jurors hoping to be part of the deliberating process, but from
the point of view of the defendant-and one would hope from the point of view of
those working to eliminate racism from the criminal trial-a multi-hued jury should
67. Under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 24(c), alternates are selected immediately
after the seating of the jurors who will actually deliberate. The alternates have no authority
unless and until one of the original jurors is excused. Rule 24(c)(2)(B) provides: "Alternate
jurors replace jurors in the same sequence in which the alternates were selected." FED. R. CRIM.
P. 24(c)(2)(B).
Rule 24 appears neutral and fair on its face, but when scrutinized more closely we see a
fagade allowing for racial injustice through the luck of the draw. Let us say twelve jurors were
selected to hear the criminal indictment and that ten of these jurors were white and two were
black. Let us also suppose that four alternates were selected, the first three being white and the
fourth one black. If one of the original two black jurors become sick and is excused, under Rule
24 the juror selected as the replacement will necessarily be white. While this has the patina of
racial neutrality surrounding it, it represents a failure on the part of the justice system to be more
vigorous in assuring that the defendant, particularly one of color, has other people of color
judging his fate.
Maine replicates the federal procedure by designating alternates before the trial begins, and
when necessary, a replacement juror is chosen from among the "alternate jurors in the order in
which they are called." ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1258 (West 2004).
My state of Rhode Island presents a variation on the theme. Pursuant to Rule 24 of the Rhode
Island Rules of Criminal Procedure, there is no requirement that the alternates be designated as
such prior to the trial getting under way. At the end of the trial and prior to the commencement
of deliberations if more than twelve jurors remain seated, "the clerk in the presence of the court
and the parties shall put the names of the remaining jurors in a box and from it shall draw 12
names, or such other number stipulated to by the parties, to determine the issues." R.I. SUPER.
CT. R. CraM. P. 24(c). The names not drawn from the box, meaning the surplus names above
twelve, are then discharged. Again, we see the problem from the viewpoint of a defendant of
color, as well as that of a system trying to address the problem of racial marginalization gener-
ally. Assuming all the participants in the jury selection process-the judge, the prosecution and
the defense-have worked in good faith to conform to the Batson ideal, and further assuming
that from the general panel two of the fourteen jurors selected are people of color, we now all
repair to a roulette wheel to vindicate a constitutional right. This is a bizarre situation unknown
to any other area of the law. We do not spin a barrel or cut cards to see whether Miranda
warnings should be given in a custodial interrogation, nor do we roll dice to determine whether
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not ultimately rest on the roll of the dice. 68
As the problem of racism and racist outcomes in the American criminal trial
are multi-faceted and systemic, only an incorrigible Pollyanna would have wel-
comed Batson as a panacea. There can be no doubt, however, that a minority
defendant increases his odds of receiving a fair trial by having on his jury people
with ears attuned to the narrative he recites, especially if the case is not a slam-
dunk for the prosecution.
Moreover, no one could have expected from Batson the elimination of the
problems of race from criminal trials, any more then one should expect that a new
day dawns for criminal justice and civil rights because the presence of African-
Americans, women, and other minorities is increasing on the bench. Indeed, some
research in the field supports the proposition that black judges impose tougher
sentences on blacks than white judges do.6 9 In one study, researchers examined
decisions by the appointments to the federal bench that President George W. Bush
ended during his first term and concluded that in 65% of their decisions involving
criminal law and civil liberties, the outcomes were "conservative. ' ' 70 What is tell-
ing is that President Bush made more appointments of women and minorities than
some of his predecessors, yet these judges voted conservatively at about the same
rate as their white colleagues. 7 1
a warrant was validly issued or not. The simple solution to the jury selection process is to have
the judge, in the presence of counsel for both sides, but outside the presence of the jurors, with-
draw from the barrel the names of the minority jurors and designate them as part of the final
twelve to deliberate. Following this, the clerk, under supervision of the judge, would proceed to
select the remaining jurors until the total of twelve is reached.
68. For a thoughtful discussion advocating "a blanket prohibition on the exclusion of Afri-
can-American venirepersons when race is implicated in the trial," see Kenneth B. Nunn, Rights
Held Hostage: Race, Ideology and the Peremptory Challenge, 28 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 63,
118 (1993).
69. See, e.g., DAVID B. MUinLAUSEN, THE DETERMINANTS OF SENTENCING IN PENNSYLVANIA: Do
THE CHARACTERISTICS OF JUDGES REALLY MATTER? (Center for Data Analysis Report No. 04-02,
2004), at http://www.heritage.orglResearch/Crime/cdaO4-02.cfm (Feb. 18, 2004). The author's
analysis of data leads him to conclude that "black judges in this study were involved in cases
where the incarceration lengths were harsher than sentences administered by white judges" and
that "[w]hile disparities in sentencing of black offenders sentenced by white judges were not
found, the sentences of black offenders by black judges were longer than the sentences of white
offenders by white judges." Id. at 23, 24. As to why this is so, Mr. Muhlhausen, a Senior Policy
Analyst in the Center for Data Analysis at the Heritage Foundation, speculates that "black judges
may be more concerned for the plight of minority victims than for the rights of minority crimi-
nals." Id. at 24.
70. Robert A. Carp et al. The Decision-Making Behavior of George W Bush's Judicial Ap-
pointees: Far-Right, Conservative, or Moderate? 88 JUDICATURE 20, 27-28 (July-Aug. 2004).
71. Id. at 22. The author concluded: "the evidence suggests that conservative ideology rather
than 'affirmative action' is the predominant motivating force behind the Bush judicial appoint-
ments." Id. But see Sherrilyn A. Ifill, Racial Diversity on the Bench: Beyond Role Models and
Public Confidence, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 405 (2000) (positing that more black judges on the
bench will enhance the dispensing of justice so long as the judges represent "outsider" commu-
nities; and Professor Ifill also advocates the support of "white judges who are capable of bring-
ing outsider voices to judicial decision-making."). Id. at 495.
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II. "THEY ALL LOOK ALIKE": THE INHERENT DIFFICULTIES
OF CROSS-RACIAL IDENTIFICATION72
Crucial evidence in many criminal trials is the testimony of an eyewitness
pointing to the defendant as the perpetrator of the crime. Sometimes the eyewit-
ness is the victim and sometimes an observer who may or may not have previously
known the principals in the incident. In any event, jurors are generally impressed
by it.
The conventional admonition to jurors by trial judges comes to the courtroom
via Neil v. Biggers73 and Manson v. Brathwaite,74 which acknowledged that there
are more difficulties with in-court identification by eyewitnesses than simply the
possibility of tainting through an unduly suggestive show-up or line-up conducted
prior to the trial.75 Instructions to jurors drawn from the Manson analysis alert
them to problems with eyewitness identification such as the stress of the observer,
the duration of the observation, lighting conditions, previous familiarity with the
defendant, and so on.76 Into this mix, we must factor race, and in particular, the
problem of cross-racial identification.
Even a nodding acquaintance with the history of this country reveals the spe-
cial problems associated with cross-racial crime, especially in the South. Even
putting this aside, the risks of cross-racial misidentification remain. Scholarship
over the past three decades in both the social sciences and the law indicates a
pervasive problem when members of one race are called upon to give identifica-
tion testimony regarding a defendant of another race.
Twenty years ago in a seminal article, Professor Sheri Lynn Johnson accu-
rately described judicial predilections regarding cross-racial misidentification that
still obtain today. She wrote that "[m]ost courts will not allow defense counsel to
introduce expert testimony on the own-race effect on the ground that cross-exami-
nation is the proper way to elicit information on a witness's credibility."7 7 Profes-
sor Johnson was writing, of course, before Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharnaceuti-
cals, Inc.,78 in which the Supreme Court offered a guide for trial judges consider-
ing the admission of expert testimony; significantly, she wrote without the benefit
72. "They all look alike" has long been a stereotypical observation shared among members of
one racial group when discussing the appearances of racial groups other than their own. As will
be discussed in this section, the social sciences have confirmed that there exists a problem of
cross-racial misidentification that undergirds the stereotype; indeed, one commentator on the
problem inserted the stereotypical epigram into his title. See John P. Rutledge, They All Look
Alike: The Inaccuracy of Cross-Racial Identifications, 28 AM. J. CRIM. L. 207 (2000-01).
73. 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
74. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
75. See U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228-36 (1967); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298
(1967).
76. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114. ("These [factors] include the opportunity of the
witness to view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness' degree of attention, the accu-
racy of his prior description of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated at the confronta-
tion, and the time between the crime and the confrontation."). This case involved a pre-trial
identification, but the analysis can be tailored to any situation involving identification testi-
mony. Cf United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558-59 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (applying factors to
trial identification).
77. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Cross-racial Identification Errors in Criminal Cases, 69 CORNELL L.
REV. 924, 953 (1984); see also Johnson, supra note 1.
78. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
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of the exoneration data and its revelations about erroneous convictions of minority
defendants due to mistaken identification by white witnesses.
The Gross study, Exonerations in the United States,79 concluded that eyewit-
ness misidentification is a principal cause of wrongful convictions, regardless of
the race of the defendant, but cross-racial identification exacerbates the problem.
Of the 199 murder exonerations that Gross and his colleagues studied, 49% of
these convictions were attributable to eyewitness misidentification; and regarding
the 120 rape exonerations in the study, 88% of the convictions resulted from
misidentification. 80
Race emerges as a potent factor when the rape figures are examined closely.
The Gross researchers indicated that their data contained "the race of the victim
for 75% of the 69 rape exonerations with black defendants, and in 75% of those
cases the victim was white," 8 1 though the larger picture is that rapes of white
women by black men account for only 5-6% of all reported rapes. 82 The shaky
reliability of an identification by any victim of a horrific and traumatic event is
understandable; but in no way am I suggesting that the victim can never get it
right. I am urging, however, that judges rely on the available data regarding the
problem of cross-racial identification and then act fairly to ensure that jurors are
alerted to this reality in a thoughtful manner.
Expert testimony, we know from federal and state codes as well as the com-
mon law-like all evidence-is admissible upon an initial determination by the
trial judge that it is relevant. This determination is not made in a vacuum, nor is it
to be made according to caprice or whimsy, but rather it is to rest on a principled
justification.83 At present, we possess sufficient facts that coalesce to militate in
favor of exercising judicial discretion to allow expert testimony in situations in-
volving an identification that crosses racial lines. These facts are: (1) the expert
consensus of social scientists that it is more difficult in a stress-filled situation for
people to identify an actor who is a member of a race other than their own; (2) the
information and statistics regarding eye-witness identification gathered both by
social scientists and legal experts has passed peer review scrutiny and can satisfy
the Daubert requirements; (3) some courts have admitted such testimony without
any injury to the trial process; (4) the information recently developed about exon-
erations shows that wrongful convictions are often attributable to cross-racial
misidentification.
The use of an eyewitness identification expert will not eliminate the possibil-
ity of a faulty conviction based on cross-racial misidentification, any more than
moving toward a greater utilization of such experts should be construed as an ac-
knowledgment that valid convictions of actually guilty people never resulted when
the eyewitness and the defendant were of different races. But the use of the expert
will do what experts in any context are suppose to do-assist the fact finders by
providing them with information normally not possessed by lay people-and thereby
79. See supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text for a detailed discussion of this study.
80. Gross, supra note 16, at 19, tbl. 3.
81. Id. at 22.
82. Id. at 23 n.50.
83. For a thoughtful discourse on the ethical obligation of judges to articulate reasons for
their rulings and decisions, see RICHARD A. WASSERSTRoM, THE JUDICIAL DECISION: TOWARD A
THEORY OF LEGAL JUSTIFICATION (1961).
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reduce the possibility of an erroneous conviction. Those of us without impaired
vision are aware of the inherent difficulty in identifying persons or objects from a
distance, and/or suddenly, and/or in poor lighting, etc., and therefore should en-
dorse the opportunity to use an expert. As one federal judge observed:
A court should not dismiss scientific knowledge about every day subjects. Sci-
ence investigates the mundane as well as the exotic. That a subject is within
daily experience does not mean that jurors know it correctly. A major conclusion
of the social sciences is that many beliefs based on personal experience are mis-
taken .... 84
IV. THE BURDEN OF PROOF: CONSTITUTIONAL "LITE" MEANS
MORE CONVICTIONS
A pervasive problem of our criminal justice system is that judges regularly
instruct juries in criminal cases regarding the burden of proof in ways that deny to
a defendant, black or white, the protection against conviction on insufficient evi-
dence. The historic burden the prosecution must meet if a jury is to render a ver-
dict of guilty is, of course, proof beyond a reasonable doubt; but this phrase is not
always defined in the judge's instructions to the jury, and when it is, it is often in a
confusing way that effectively dilutes the government's obligation so that convic-
tions are regularly obtained with a less rigorous standard.
As a practical matter, simple logic tells us that there are several consequences
of the failure of state and federal trial judges to give an appropriate instruction on
the government's burden of proof. First, a lowered burden of proof inevitably
increases the number of convictions; and while it would be fair to argue that many
of the persons convicted on a lesser standard are actually guilty, it is just as reason-
able to conclude that many actually innocent people are also being convicted. As
the Supreme Court has made clear, a conviction on a standard less than proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt is never a harmless error; 85 but in today's legal universe,
there are in our prisons and jails many inmates, both black and white, convicted on
a constitutionally deficient standard. Many of these people may well be actually
guilty, but they languish in prison as the result of an unfair trial, something that the
Constitution does not contemplate or countenance. More troubling, there are also
many actually innocent people who have been victimized by this state of affairs.
And we know from the figures reflecting the inequitable racial makeup of the
prison populations that minorities undoubtedly suffer at a greater rate than whites.
What should jurors be told about the government's burden of proof-and how
can I assert that this is not being done? It is easy to lift from the Supreme Court's
jurisprudence a simple and succinct definition of the government's burden in crimi-
nal cases. In 1895, the United States Supreme Court turned to an English case
decided almost eighty yearsearlier to explain the prosecution's obligation: "[The
presumption of innocence] is a maxim which ought to be inscribed in indelible
characters in the heart of every judge and juryman .... To overturn this, there
84. United States v. Hall, 165 F.3d 1095, 1118 (7th Cir. 1999) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
85. See Sullivan v. Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275, 281 (1993) (finding that constitutionally defi-
cient reasonable doubt instruction can never be harmless error) (citing Arizona v. Fulminante,
499 U.S. 279, 309 (1991)).
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must be legal evidence of guilt, carrying home a decree of conviction short only of
absolute certainty."'86
Seventy-five years later, the Supreme Court refined its language when it in-
sisted again that, for there to be a conviction, the collective state of the jurors'
minds must be in the domain of near certainty. In In re Winship, the Court held that
the government's proof must leave the fact finder's mind in a "subjective state of
certitude," and that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was the equivalent of proof to
an "utmost certainty." 87 A short while later, the Court used nearly identical lan-
guage, declaring that, for a valid conviction to result, the jurors' minds must be in
a "subjective state of near certitude." 88
As the Supreme Court has clearly defined proof beyond a reasonable doubt in
terms of a subjective state of near certainty on the part of jurors, why aren't judges
regularly employing this language? A cynic might answer that many judges are
happy to extend to the prosecution an easier device for conviction than the one
required by due process, but each observer of the American criminal trial and the
criminal justice system will have to reach his or her own conclusions about this.
What is a fact of jurisprudential history, however, is that the United States Su-
preme Court has not mandated that either lower federal courts or state courts em-
ploy a definition reciting language reflective of its "near certitude" or "utmost
certainty" language. On the contrary, when the Court in 1994 was called upon to
review murky and confusing criminal burden of proof instructions, it had an op-
portunity to require state judges to make reference to its Winship and Jackson
pronouncements for the sake of clarity and uniformity, but it declined, asserting
that "we have no supervisory power over the state courts." 89
The Supreme Court's long-standing refusal to provide guidance in this crucial
area of criminal law is mystifying when one considers the Court's zeal in creating
a jurisprudence for the Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Amendments. More importantly,
however, some lower federal appellate courts and state appeals courts have been
emboldened to command trial judges in their jurisdictions not to offer jurors any
definition of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Fourth Circuit has spoken categorically: "This circuit has repeatedly
warned against giving the jury definitions of reasonable doubt, because definitions
tend to impermissibly lessen the burden of proof."90 And Chief Justice Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit has opined: "[D]eeply entrenched in the popular
culture as it is, the term 'beyond a reasonable doubt' may be the single legal term
that jurors understand best." 9 1 This notion was rejected by Justice Ginsburg in her
86. Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 456 (1895) (quoting McKinley's case (1817), 33
St. Tr. 275, 506 (emphasis supplied)).
87. 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (citation omitted).
88. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 315 (1979).
89. Victor v. Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 17 (1994).
90. United States v. Adkins, 937 F.2d 947, 950 (4th Cir. 1991).
91. United States v. Hall, 854 F.2d 1036, 1044 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J., concurring). See
also Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054, 1060-61 (5th Cir. 1987) (stating that the Fifth Cir-
cuit disfavors attempts by district courts to define reasonable doubt). A student comment rec-
ommending that no explanation of the term based its position on federal cases as well as deci-
sions of the highest courts of Illinois, Mississippi, Texas, and Wyoming which prohibited jury
instructions that attempted to define the standard. Henry A. Diamond, Comment, Reasonable
Doubt: To Define or Not to Define, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1716, 1719-20 (1990).
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concurring opinion in Victor v. Nebraska: "the words 'beyond a reasonable doubt'
are not self-defining for jurors."'92
Thoughtful observers of the trial as an institution have always maintained that
precision and clarity on the part of the judge when instructing the jury is crucial to
the enterprise of doing justice. Justice Felix Frankfurter put it well in Bollenbach
v. United States, when he wrote that a jury can draw appropriate conclusions only
when the judge assumes the responsibility of providing a declaration of relevant
legal criteria with "concrete accuracy." 93 Justice Frankfurter emphasized that "a
conviction ought not to rest on an equivocal direction to the jury on a basic is-
sue." 94
Professor Edmund M. Morgan was blunt in his criticism of appellate deci-
sions and the adverse impact they have when trial judges feel impelled to enunci-
ate the law in terms employed by reviewing tribunals:
[T]here can be little doubt that some appellate courts adopt a totally unrealistic
attitude in construing instructions to the jury, and assume that jurors get not only
the general impression which the words convey, but that they make a micro-
scopic examination of each instruction in the light of the strict rules of grammar
and rhetoric, with the result that trial judges in self-defense are compelled to
formulate charges so complex that no ordinary body of men could hope to under-
stand them.95
Though all jury instructions are important, nothing can be more devastating to
the criminal defendant's right to a constitutionally correct trial than to have the
judge's charge dilute the government's burden of proof. Chief Judge Jon 0. Newman
of the Second Circuit signaled the problem as a national one in a speech to profes-
sors and students at New York University Law School, which he later developed in
a 1993 article in that school's law review. Chief Judge Newman castigated his
fellow federal judges for having "failed to take the [reasonable doubt] standard
seriously as a rule of law against which the validity of convictions is to be judged. ' 96
The judge went on to say that American courts generally refuse "to take this stan-
dard seriously and apply it conscientiously as a rule of law.' 97 Summing up, he
said: "[Wie have insisted that juries be instructed that they must be persuaded
beyond a reasonable doubt, but we have not insisted on meaningful observance of
this standard as a rule of law for testing the sufficiency of the evidence." 98
92. 511 U.S. at 26 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
93. 326 U.S. 607, 612-13 (1946).
94. Id. at 613.
95. Edmund M. Morgan, Instructing the Jury Upon Presumptions and Burden of Proof, 47
HARv. L. REv. 59, 59-60 n.1 (1933).
96. Jon 0. Newman, Beyond "Reasonable Doubt," 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 979, 980 (1993).
97. Id. at 990.
98. Id. at 989. See also Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., Instructing on Reasonable Doubt After
Victor v. Nebraska: A Trial Judge's Certain Thoughts on Certainty, 41 VILL. L. REv. 365 (1996),
in which I argued for an instruction that expressly references the Supreme Court's doctrinal
pronouncements about certainty rather than abstruse metaphysical discussions on the nature of a
reasonable doubt (e.g., "A doubt that is not fanciful," "reasonable doubt is a doubt based on
reason," etc.). My proposed instruction is:
The government must prove each and every element of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt. This is a very high burden of proof. It means that you may find the defendant
guilty only if, after reviewing all the evidence and discussing the evidence with your
fellow jurors, you are convinced in your mind that it is just about certain-or nearly
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V. HARD ROCKS AND HARD PLACES: THE RULE 609 DILEMMA
One of the more important decisions to confront a defendant during the course
of a criminal trial is whether to take the stand in his own defense or not. Apart
from any strategic decisions based on an evaluation of the strength of the state's
case, the defendant must examine the possibility of being confronted with his prior
convictions.99 Federal Rule 609 confers on judges the discretion to measure the
probative value of admitting evidence of a prior conviction against prejudicial ef-
fect; and this discretion may be used in all circumstances except when the condi-
tion goes directly to a crime "involving dishonesty or false statement ...."100
State rules regarding the admissibility of prior convictions follow this approach
generally, or else have other devices for a judge to utilize in balancing probative
value against prejudicial effect, 10 1 as they regularly do with all relevancy ques-
certain-that the defendant committed the crime. If after reviewing the evidence,
your mind is in such a state that you are not just about certain--or nearly certain-
that the defendant committed the crime, you must return a verdict of not guilty.
Id. at 427. Defendants have been both convicted and acquitted with this charge, but no one
found guilty could complain that the charge was confusing or that it permitted the government to
obtain a guilty verdict using a diluted burden of persuasion. Aneedotally, I can report that after
some trials resulting in acquittals, jurors told me that they "sensed" or "had a hunch" that the
defendant was guilty, but in light of the charge-and their oath felt obliged to return with a"not guilty verdict." For an observation that jurors can act in a converse fashion, see Hans
Sherrer, The Complicity of Judges in the Generation of Wrongful Convictions, 30 N. Ky. L. REV.
539, 577 (2003):
[Jiurors have been known to comment after a trial that they thought the defendant was
not guilty, but based on what the judge told them to do, or perhaps only implied they
must do (through his tone of voice and body language), they felt like they had to vote
guilty, if for no other reason than to make the judge happy.
99. See Alan D. Hornstein, Between Rock and a Hard Place: The Right to Testify and Im-
peachment by Prior Conviction, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1997) [hereinafter Hornstein] (exploring the
development of a defendant's right to testify to keep the jury from learning of his prior convic-
tions, culminating in Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (1987)).
100. FED. R. EviD. 609, Impeachment by Evidence of Conviction of Crime, provides, in part,
as follows:
(a) General rule. For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness,
(1) evidence that a witness other than an accused has been convicted of a crime shall
be admitted, subject to Rule 403, if the crime was punishable by death or imprison-
ment in excess of one year under the law under which the witness was convicted, and
evidence that an accused has been convicted of such a crime shall be admitted if the
court determines that the probative value of admitting this evidence outweighs its
prejudicial effect to the accused; and
(2) evidence that any witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if it
involved dishonesty or false statement, regardless of the punishment.
101. See also, e.g., CAL. Evio. CODE § 788 (Deering 2004) (providing that by examination of
the witness or by recorded judgment of felony conviction may be shown unless:
(a) A pardon based on his innocence has been granted to the witness by the jurisdic-
tion in which he was convicted.
(b) A certificate of rehabilitation and pardon has been granted to the witness under the
provisions of Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 4852.01) of Title 6 of Part 3 of
the Penal Code.
(c) The accusatory pleading against the witness has been dismissed under the provi-
sions of Penal Code Section 1203.4, but this exception does not apply to any criminal
trial where the witness is being prosecuted for a subsequent offense.
(d) The conviction was under the laws of another jurisdiction and the witness has
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tions under the mantle of Rule 104. But what is of concern here is the supposed
logic-or inherent illogic-of the rule as well as the accumulated data that inexo-
rably leads to the conclusion that the use of Rule 609, while hard on any criminal
defendant who takes the stand, is more likely to present problems for minority
defendants. The assumption of the rule, of course, is two-pronged: (1) that a past
criminal conviction or convictions furnishes probative evidence that a defendant is
not a credible witness; and (2) the jury will be able to follow a judge's instruction
that prior convictions may be used only to demonstrate a lack of credibility but not
as evidence of the crime for which the defendant is on trial. That a prior convic-
tion, dating back two or three years prior to the trial, leads irresistibly and inevita-
bly to the conclusion that the defendant will necessarily lie is not supported by
common sense or a serious commitment to the presumption, or assumption, of
innocence. 102
The criminal trial, after all, endeavors to recreate an historical event for the
jurors, but the principal question they must resolve is whether the government has
met its burden of proof. The defendant, in effect, challenges the government to
produce evidence of his guilt regarding criminal activity that occurred at a particu-
lar time and place. Whether he engaged in criminal acts at some other times and
places is in no way germane to the jury's considerations. Moreover, there is no
reason to conclude that someone who in 1998 and 1999 received cocaine convic-
tions and in 2000 was convicted of simple assault, is necessarily the person who
robbed the convenience store in 2003, or that he will probably lie about his where-
abouts at the time the robbery was committed.
If trials consisted of offering juries a choice to convict one out of two possible
candidates for committing a specific crime, and one of the candidates had four
convictions while the other was a model-citizen with no criminal record, then per-
haps the odds game Rule 609 foists on juries would make sense. But trials do not
offer juries that stark an option, and the vaunted strength of our system is that the
conviction or acquittal will be based on the strength or weaknesses of the state's
case and not on the past and unrelated transgressions of the accused. One other
twist regarding the illogic of the situation was addressed by a commentator on this
problem: given the fact most convictions result from plea bargains, the prior guilty
plea of a defendant-presumably a true admission of a criminal act-could lead to
an inference of prior truthfulness. 10 3
If the defendant elects to take the stand and if a record of a prior conviction or
convictions is admitted, the judge will tell the jury that the prior convictions can-
been relieved of the penalties and disabilities arising from the conviction pursuant to
a procedure substantially equivalent to that referred to in subdivision (b) or (c)).
ME. R. EvID. 609(a) (2004) (providing, in part, that "admissibility shall depend upon a determi-
nation by the court that the probative value of this evidence upon witness credibility outweighs
any unfair prejudice to a criminal defendant or to any civil party."); TEXAS R. Evin. 609 (West
2004) (providing, in part, that "[f]or the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence that the witness has been convicted of a crime shall be admitted if elicited from the wit-
ness or established by public record but only if the crime was a felony or involved moral turpi-
tude, regardless of punishment, and the court determines that the probative value of admitting
this evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect to a party").
102. Taylor v. Kentucky, 436 U.S. 478, 484 n.12 (1978) (stating that the "presumption of
innocence" was actually an "assumption" rather than a "presumption" (citing Carr v. State, 192
Miss. 152, 156, 4 So.2d 887, 888 (1941))).
103. Hornstein, supra note 99, at 13.
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not be used as evidence directly supporting the prosecution's allegations regarding
the crime giving rise to the trial, but that the jurors, as fact finders and evaluators
of the believability of all the witnesses, may factor the prior conviction(s) into
their credibility determination. The widely respected treatise, McCormick on Evi-
dence, suggests that jurors will often disregard this distinction despite the judge's
instruction and will look upon a conviction as another evidentiary arrow in the
prosecution's quiver.104 Common sense should tell us that this is a reasonable
assessment because the distinction is nuanced and is delivered to lay people along
with numerous other legal principles that they must grasp in a relatively short
period of time.
An equally distressing appraisal of the misuse of prior conviction evidence is
found in the classic study by Harry Kalven and Hans Zeisel, The American Jury,
where they compared cases with similar probabilities of acquittal and concluded
that, on average, when a jury had knowledge of a defendant's prior criminal record
the probability of acquittal decreased from 42% to 25%. 105 Obviously, if getting a
defendant's criminal record before the jury did not have a significant impact favor-
able to the prosecution, prosecutors would not fight so vigorously to have it admit-
ted and defense attorneys would not fight just as vigorously to keep it out. 106
While the admission of a prior record hurts a defendant, whatever his color,
blacks wishing to testify in their own defense in a criminal trial are more disadvan-
taged as a group than whites. This proposition is supported by statistical data
collected and analyzed by scholars studying arrest, conviction and incarceration
rates regarding different racial groups, and disparate educational and income lev-
els. Researchers Becky Pettit and Bruce Western drew on other studies, govern-
ment statistics, and their own analysis to paint a painful picture:
(1) "By 1999, more than 40 percent of black male high school dropouts, aged 22
to 30, were in prison or jail," and this figure takes on added significance when
one considers that the "overall national rate of incarceration [was] .69 of 1 per-
cent in 1999"; 107 (2) "The cumulative risk of imprisonment is 3 to 4 times higher
for high school dropouts than for high school graduates. About 1 out of 9 white
male high school dropouts, born in the late 1960s would serve prison time before
age 35 compared to 1 out of 25 high school graduates. The cumulative risk of
incarceration is about 5 times higher for black men. Incredibly, a black male
dropout born 1965-69 had nearly a 60 percent chance of serving time in prison by
the end of the 1990s"; 108 (3) "The estimated lifetime risk of imprisonment for
black men is 28.5 percent compared to 4.4 percent for white men"; 109 (4) "Among
all men, whites in their early thirties are more than twice as likely to hold a
bachelor's degree than blacks. Blacks are about 50 percent more likely to have
104. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 42, at 168-69 (John W. Strong ed., 5 ed. 1999).
105. HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 159-62 (1966).
106. LEWIS MAYERS, SHALL WE AMEND THE FIT AMENDMENT? 21 (1959) (stating that 71% of
poll respondents inferred guilt from a defendant's refusal to testify).
107. Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Inequality in Lifetime Risks of Imprisonment 1 (Mar.
2003) (citation to study omitted). This thoughtful monograph is in the possession of the author;
drafts were presented in 2001 at the annual meetings of the Population Association of America
and the American Sociological Association.
108. Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and
Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. Soc. REv. 151, 160-61 (2004).
109. Id. at 156.
served in the military. However black men are about 7 times more likely [than
whites] to have a prison record. "110
From these and other depressing facts, Pettit and Western concluded som-
berly: "This evidence suggests that by 1999 imprisonment had become a common
life event for black men that sharply distinguished their transition to adulthood
from that of white men." 1 1I
There are several underlying causes for the phenomena represented by these
figures. Full discussion of these topics is beyond the scope of this essay but thought-
ful expositions are available elsewhere. Among the oft referenced causes are: the
portrayal in public policy declarations and the mass media of young black males as
predators; 1 12 the so-called, and not very successful, war on drugs, with blacks
being hammered for criminal involvement with crack while whites are treated more
benignly respecting the powdered variety of the drug; 1 13 aggressive tactics by the
police in poor, predominantly black urban neighborhoods;114 racial profiling; and
"driving while black."' 1 5 The disproportionate representation in the prison popu-
lation and hence, a disproportionate population on the street of black males, mostly
young, with prison records presents a dire picture; but as bad as it is, it becomes
even worse when placed alongside the findings of racial disparities in Professor
Gross' exoneration study. 1 16
Additionally, probation and parole place the offender on a tightrope without a
net-or a flimsy one-to catch his fall. Not only do persons on probation and
parolees return in large numbers to communities ill equipped to meet their eco-
110. Id. at 164 (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 164.
112. See MAUER, supra note 1, at 171-77; MILLER, supra note 1, at 37-47; RUSSELL, supra note
1, at 8-11.
113. See, e.g., MICHAEL COYLE, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, RACE AND CLASS PENALTIES IN CRACK
CoCAINE SENTENCING (2002) (available athttp:/Iwww.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/5077.pdf); Laura
A. Wytsma, Note, Punishment for "'Just Us "-A Constitutional Analysis of the Crack Cocaine
Sentencing Statutes, 3 GEO. MASON INDEP. L. REV. 473 (1995). For a thoughtful judicial critique
advocating the increased use of state drug courts and counseling rather than incarceration for
most drug offenders, see Donald P. Lay, Editorial, Rehab Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 18, 2004, at
A3 1.
114. For an illuminating chronicle of this practice that hones in on small geographic areas
defined by zip codes or neighborhood boundaries, see Paul Street, Chicago Urban League, THE
VICIOUS CIRCLE: RACE, PRISON, JOBS, COMMUNITY AND MASS INCARCERATIONS IN CHICAGO, Illinois,
and the Nation, Executive Summary (2002), available at http://www.cul-chicago.org/RP/
the%20vicious%20circle.pdf. For another micro-demographic study, see MARSHALL CLEMENT &
NINA KEOUGH, The Family Life Center, POLmCAL PUItSHMENT: THE CONSEQUENCES OF FELON Dis-
ENFRANCHISEMENTFOR RHODE ISLAND COMMUNITIES, available athttp://www.ri-familylifecenter.orgi
reports/PoliticalPunishment.pdf.
115. There has been extensive discussion of racial profiling and its ugly sibling, the pretext
stop. See, e.g., Angela J. Davis, Race, Cops, and Traffic Stops, 51 U. MIAMI L. REV. 425 (1997);
Robin Shepard Engel & Jennifer M. Calnon, Examining the Influence of Drivers' Characteris-
tics During Traffic Stops with Police: Results from a National Survey, 21 JUST. Q. 49 (2004);
Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack, 102 COLUM. L. REv. 1413
(2002); Gregory M. Lipper, Racial Profiling, 38 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 551 (2001); David Rudovsky,
Breaking the Pattern of Racial Profiling, 38 TRIAL, Aug. 2002, at 29; Katheryn K. Russell, "Driving
While Black": Corollary Phenomena and Collateral Consequences, 40 B.C. L. REV. 717 (1999);
Carl J. Schifferle, After Whren v. United States: Applying the Equal Protection Clause to Ra-
cially Discriminatory Enforcement of the Law, 2 MICH. L. & POL'Y Rav. 159 (1997).
116. GRoss, supra note 16; see also supra notes 16-36 and accompanying text.
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nomic, educational, and mental health needs, officialdom burdens them addition-
ally with a criminal record to be revealed to potential employers and with disen-
franchisement that excludes them from any voice in community governance.
My State, Rhode Island, has a statute typical of many in force around the
country regarding the expungement--or more accurately, the sealing of criminal
records. 117 The statute presents problems on its face and as applied. Though the
person recently released to the streets needs ajob immediately, and preferably one
that pays a living wage, there is a five-year waiting period to expunge a misde-
meanor conviction and a ten-year wait to remove a felony conviction from public
view. Judicial discretion is restricted, 118 and the statute provides for the removal
of only one conviction; in other words, if someone has two or three convictions on
her record which are separated in time by a few months or a few years, she is
ineligible for expungement even if she has turned her life around through complet-
ing educational or vocational programs, benefiting from a drug rehabilitation pro-
gram, participating in wholesome community activities, demonstrating responsible
motherhood, and so on.
The black ex-convict faces still more problems. The lack of reasonable and
rational expungement statutes gives cover to racist employers to refuse to hire
people of color on the guise that the job is being denied solely because the appli-
cant has a conviction or convictions. Because a large percentage of African-Ameri-
can males have criminal records, the effect of being rejected for a decent job has
disastrous economic consequences for minority communities as well as the indi-
vidual job seeker.
A harmful effect on the community is also seen with disenfranchisement. Forty-
eight of the fifty states prohibit convicted felons from voting, either permanently
or temporarily; Maine and Vermont are the two enlightened exceptions. Using
figures available in 2004, The Sentencing Project of Human Rights Watch con-
cluded that 4.7 million citizens were disenfranchised as a result of a felony convic-
tion, including over 1.7 million who have fully completed their sentences. 119 Re-
garding the impact of disenfranchisement laws in black communities, The Sen-
tencing Project noted that "1.4 million African American men, or 13% of black
men, are disenfranchised." 120 The study warned ominously: "Given current rates
of incarceration, three in ten of the next generation of black men can expect to be
disenfranchised at some point in their lifetime. In states that disenfranchise ex-
offenders, as many as 40% of black men may permanently lose their right to
vote.' 12 1 Naturally, where the concentration of black people is highest, the harm-
117. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-1.3-3. The proper word is "sealing" because the records are not
permanently destroyed but rather made inaccessible to prospective employers and others who
might claim a need to learn of their existence. At some future point in time, if the beneficiary of
the "expungement" is accused of criminal activity, law enforcement officials have ready access
to the records to determine if the accused has a background of criminal convictions.
118. See, e.g., State v. Alejo, 723 A.2d 762, 764 (R.I. 1999).
119. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN UNITED STATES-OVER-
viw I, (2005), at www.sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1046.pdf, updating JAMIE FELLNER & MARC
MAUER, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, LOSING THE VOTE: THE IMPACT OF FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT




ful effects on the community will be greatest. According to a Newsweek cover
story published in 2000, in at least nine states, more than 20% of black males are
temporarily or permanently banned from voting due to a felony conviction. 122
The argument that allowing convicted felons presently at liberty to vote would
somehow dilute the purity of the electoral process is absurd. Every non-felon who
votes is hardly a paragon of moral rectitude or well-informed about current events.
But perhaps the most damming criticism that can be levied against the disenfran-
chisement practices is that it perpetuates the legacy of racism, not only because of
the statistics just noted, but because as a matter of historical fact, felon disenfran-
chisement laws became a key weapon of racists to keep blacks away from polling
places after the Civil War and during reconstruction: "Today, scholars widely ac-
knowledge the historically racist motives underlying criminal disenfranchisement
in the South. The Supreme Court has also recognized this history."' 123 Professor
Andrew Shapiro documented the efforts of state constitutional conventions in tar-
geting blacks through their disenfranchisement statutes. 124 He wrote of the crip-
pling effects of this strategy on black communities:
The effort was remarkably successful: blacks made up 44% of the electorate in
Louisiana after the Civil War, but less than 1% in 1920. Almost 70% of eligible
blacks were registered to vote in Mississippi in 1867; less than 6% were regis-
tered two years after that state's 1890 disenfranchising convention. 125
Attacks have recently been mounted against state disenfranchisement legisla-
tion under the Voting Rights Act, but these efforts ran into the Supreme Court's
stonewall of certiorari denial. 126 If there is to be any reform in the foreseeable
future, it will probably come through legislative rather then judicial action. This
type of endeavor would be aided greatly by judges speaking before public interest
groups and legislative committees to bring about decent and humane changes in
the areas of expungement and disenfranchisement. 127 The arguments to be made
are simple. Regarding expungement, it is beyond dispute that a criminal record
impedes one's rise out of poverty, which is, after all, one of the preconditions of
most criminal activity in the first place. Moreover, legislators should be made
aware that so-called white collar and corporate transgressions, many of which have
calamitous consequences financially, environmentally, and healthwise for thou-
sands of people, result in no similar personal and political burdens for the usually
white and usually educated offender. In these matters, there is rarely any jail time,
122. FELLNER, supra note 119, at 8. It should be noted that felony disenfranchisement leads,
ipso facto, to exclusion fromjury duty. For the minority defendant, this obviously decreases the
pool of available jurors, especially young males, from which the jury will be selected. This
presents one more obstacle in the way of achieving the goals of Batson v. Kentucky. See supra
notes 46-71 and accompanying text.
123. Andrew L. Shapiro, Note, Challenging Criminal Disenfranchisement Under the Voting
RightsAct: A New Strategy, 103 YALE L. J. 537, 542 (1993) (referencing Hunter v. Underwood,
471 U.S. 222 (1985)) (citations omitted).
124. Id. at 537-42.
125. Id. at 538 (citations omitted).
126. See generally Locke v. Farrakhan, 125 S. Ct. 477, _ U.S. - (2004).
127. MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CoNDucr Canon 4B (1998) provides: "Avocational Activities:
A judge may speak, write, lecture, teach and participate in other extra-judicial activities con-
cerning the law, the legal system, the administration of justice and non-legal subjects, subject to
the requirements of this Code."
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but even when a few miscreants serve time, the corporation obviously does not go
to jail; but more important, the corporation is not forestalled by any state or federal
laws from continuing to lobby legislators or from making contributions to political
candidates. 128
With these realities in mind, I submit that the assumptions underlying Rule
609 and its state imitators should be reversed; instead of approaching the problem
of the admissibility of prior convictions with the notion that they should be placed
before the jury unless an exceptionally prejudicial circumstance is determined to
exist by the judge, a defendant's criminal record should be excluded unless the
defendant puts his character directly in issue. In a thoughtful and comprehensive
essay published in 1999, South Carolina attorney Robert D. Dodson advocated
that "a per se rule disallowing prior conviction evidence should be adopted." 129
To bolster his position, Dodson pointed to the English practice of excluding prior
conviction evidence pursuant to the Criminal Evidence Act of 1898.130 Not sur-
prisingly, there are a few exceptions to the application of this Rule, the most no-
table being the allowance of "impeachment through prior conviction evidence when
a defendant puts his character in issue. ' 131 "In effect, the rule's exception still
affords a criminal defendant protection as long as he does not actively attempt to
mislead the jury into believing that he has a spotless record."'132 Dodson noted
that the English practice has been adopted in at least five states: Hawaii, Pennsyl-
vania, Kansas, Georgia, and Montana. 133
In Maine, the legislature has not gone as far as its five sister states, but the
Supreme Judicial Court has moved in the direction of curtailing the use of prior
convictions. Interpreting that provision of Rule 609 of the Maine Rules of Evi-
dence, as amended in 1990, which provides that the "admissibility [of a prior con-
viction] shall depend upon a determination by the court that the probative value of
this evidence upon witness credibility outweighs any unfair prejudice to a criminal
defendant," 134 the Supreme Judicial Court held that the defendant was under no
obligation to show that "unfair prejudice 'substantially' outweigh[s] the probative
128. See supra text accompanying note 39.
129. Robert D. Dodson, What Went Wrong With Federal Rule of Evidence 609: A Look at
How Jurors Really Misuse Prior Conviction Evidence, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 1, 51 (1999).
130. Id. at 28 (citing Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., ch. 36, § 1(f) (Eng.). The
Criminal Evidence Act provided that:
[a] person charged and called as a witness in pursuance of this Act shall not be asked,
and if asked shall not be required to answer, any question tending to show that he has
committed or convicted of or been charged with any offence other than that where-
with he is then charged ....
Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 29.
133. Id. at 22; see also HAw. REv. STAT. § 626-1 (1993); MONT. R. REv. RULE 609 (West 2004);
PA. R. EvID. 609 (2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 24-9-20 (2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-420, 60-421
(2003). Rule 609 of the Montana Rules of Evidence is the most stark prohibition on the use of
prior convictions: "For the purpose of attacking the credibility of a witness, evidence that the
witness has been convicted of a crime is not admissible." MONT. R. REv. RULE 609. The Georgia
statute is an exemplar of the English rule: "No evidence of general bad character or prior con-
victions shall be admissible unless and until the defendant shall have first put his character in
issue." GA. STAT. ANN. 24-9-20(b).
134. ME. R. EVID. 609(a).
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value of the evidence on witness credibility," but that exclusion of the criminal
record was warranted by the defendant showing "that the unfair prejudice simply
outweigh the probative value on credibility."' 135
The problems engendered by the admission into evidence of prior convic-
tions, like many of the rules or practices found in the American criminal trial, visit
unfair difficulties on all defendants-regardless of their color and regardless of
whether they are actually innocent; but because the average black male accused of
crime is more likely to have acquired a criminal record, men of color as a group
suffer the most under the prevailing scheme. 136
VI. PROBATION AND PAROLE: GREASING THE PRISON GATE
Parole and probation are commonly viewed as alternatives to incarceration,
the former always following some period of time behind bars, and the latter being
imposed as a sentence either in lieu of incarceration or a status of supervision to
follow time in prison. The benign explanation for the use of these modes of offi-
cial supervision over a convict is to monitor and assist the parolee or probationer
as he or she resumes a life in the community after conviction and/or incarceration.
But what these statuses also do is facilitate any governmental desire to return a
probationer or parolee to confinement without the expense, burden, and constitu-
tional protections of a full criminal trial.
According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, of the 565,000 reported state
prison admissions in 1998, 206,000 lost their liberty as either parole or probation
violators. 137 Other statistics develop the picture further. Approximately 42% of
all persons released from prison or jail into parole or probation supervision even-
tually are returned to confinement; 138 indeed, 62% of released state prisoners are
rearrested within three years, and 41% of this group of discharges are put back into
prison or jail. 139 One should not expect the problem to abate as approximately
40% of all state prisoners are expected to be released in any twelve-month pe-
riod, 140 and most of these will be under some form of official supervision, as are
nearly 80% of those who annually re-enter the prison apparatus as parole or proba-
tion violators. 14 1
We know that people of color will constitute a disproportionate amount of the
parolees and probationers, 142 but the question remains: What are we to make of
these figures and the legal categories of probation and parole respecting systemic
racism? These figures, either standing alone or viewed in conjunction with other
data, indicate that far too many people are being sent to jail for non-violent of-
fenses, primarily substance abuse, and that efforts at rehabilitation and retraining,
135. State v. Braley, 2003 ME 152, 5, 834 A.2d 140, 142 (citing ME. R. EVTD. 609(a) and
contrasting it with ME. R. EVID. 403).
136. See supra notes 4-12 and accompanying text.
137. Alan J. Beck, State and Federal Prisoners Returning to the Community: Findings from
the Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.oj.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/tspOO.pdf (First Reentry
Courts Initiative Cluster Meeting, Washington, D.C.), April 13, 2000, at 2.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id.
142. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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especially in the areas of drug addiction, literacy development, and job skills are
not succeeding, despite the noble efforts of many therapists and caseworkers in the
field who struggle with a lack of funds to service a large population of needy
individuals. In a report prepared at the request of the Hon. Charles B. Rangel (D-
NY) by the United States General Accounting Office, we learn that "[i]n 1997, 56
percent of state inmates and 46 percent of federal inmates reported that they had
participated in alcohol/drug treatment programs," and these percentages were the
same according to data reflecting 1991.143 It is impossible to tell from the GAO
report whether the prisoners were referencing participation in programs inside or
outside the prison walls, or whether they participated voluntarily. In any event,
one can assume that they learned they had a serious problem, and this is consistent
with the conclusion of the report submitted to Congressmen Rangel:
[D]rug and alcohol use were common among both nondrug offenders and drug
offenders. For example, the percentages of property offenders in state prison
who reported that they had used crack or powder cocaine in the month before
their current arrest, and who reported that they had been under the influence of
crack or powder cocaine at the time of their arrest, were very similar to the per-
centages of drug offenders. 144
And lastly, perhaps the most salient conclusion of the GAO report: "In both fed-
eral and state prisons in 1997, minority inmates were more likely to be incarcer-
ated for drug crimes." 14 5
When a prisoner is released into the community, the police, prosecuting offi-
cials, and probation and parole officers are well aware of the location of the neigh-
borhood where the releasee resides. They also know that even non-criminal trans-
gressions of regulations imposed by the status, such as drinking a beer in a bar or
failure to attend a therapy session, could result in liberty being revoked and the
individual returning to prison. Considerable discretion rests with parole and pro-
bation officials, not to mention prosecuting authorities, to charge someone as a
parole or probation violator; and when they elect to go this route, the officials
know the standard of proof they must meet is an easy one.
In the leading case of Morrissey v. Brewer, 146 the United States Supreme Court
held that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution required
that government officials afford a hearing to a person facing parole revocation.
Saying that it had no intention "to equate.., parole revocation to a criminal pros-
ecution in any sense," 147 and that "the process should be flexible enough to con-
sider evidence including letters, affidavits, and other material that would not be
admissible in an adversary criminal trial, '" 14 8 the Supreme Court sketched the out-
line of a permissible proceeding:
143. U.S. GENERAL AccouNTING OFFICE, REPORT To THE HON. CHARLES B. RANGEL, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES: STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS: PROFILES OF INMATE CHARACTERISTICS IN 1991
AND 1997, GA0IGGD No. 00-117, at 6-7 (2000) [hereinafter GAO REPoRr].
144. Id., at 6. The percentages referenced are found in pie graphs in figure 1 on page 4
(indicating that 20% of state prisoners under lock and key in 1997 were there for drug offenses
and 22% for property offenses, whereas in federal penitentiaries, 62% of the prisoners were
there for drug offenses and 6% property crimes).
145. Id. at 4.
146. 408 U.S. 471 (1972).
147. Id. at 489.
148. Id.
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This hearing must be the basis for more than determining probable cause; it must
lead to a final evaluation of any contested relevant facts and consideration of
whether the facts as determined warrant revocation. The parolee must have an
opportunity to be heard and to show, if he can, that he did not violate the condi-
tions, or, if he did, that circumstances in mitigation suggest that the violation
does not warrant revocation. 149
A year after Morrissey, the United States Supreme Court held that probation-
ers were entitled to the same rights as parolees when facing revocation; 150 but in
1985, the Court diluted what lower courts believed Morrissey and Gagnon re-
quired, namely that "a sentencing court ... state explicitly why it has rejected
alternatives to incarceration. ' 15 1 The Supreme Court decided that it had not ear-
lier required any such thing and that the revoking authority did not have to state
any reasons "explaining why alternatives to incarceration were not selected"; 1 52
moreover, the Court went on to say that there was no due process requirement
mandating appellate review of the "factfinder's discretionary decision as to the
appropriate sanction." 153 Of equal importance, the Court emphasized that revoca-
tion hearings "need not be composed of judges or lawyers." 154 In some states, of
course, probation revocation is a proceeding conducted by ajudge in open court. 155
The revocation system-with few procedural guarantees, official discretion at
every turn, relaxed rules of evidence, a low burden of proof, and a high tolerance
for unarticulated decisions-invites abuse. When a prisoner is released into the
community, he or she has little money and no job, but more than likely is burdened
with much of the baggage that got him or her into jail in the first place: a problem
with drug or alcohol abuse, or both; functional illiteracy and/or limited marketable
skills; family and friends, such as they are, in an impoverished and high-crime
neighborhood; and the memories of a prison experience more degrading than up-
lifting. 156 This vulnerable individual, confined now to the margins of society,
must walk a tightrope stretched across the chasm of more prison time and fastened
to only the good will (or lack thereof) of the cop on the street, the probation and
parole officials, and in some cases, the judge. The racist official-and there are
surely some at every level of the process--can shoot fish in the barrel, as can the
simply malicious or mean-spirited. The judges and others in the revocation hierar-
chy who shut their eyes to systemic racism will function as unconscious ticket-
stampers at the prison's revolving doors.
Let us not be victims of our own naivetd. Not only does the released inmate
reenter the community under the scrutiny of a host of government officials, his
tenuous status is also known to his friends, acquaintances, enemies, and signifi-
cant others. It takes little imagination to see how easily a false accusation can be
made to the probation officer or the precinct police by a rival or spurned lover: "he
149. Id. at 488.
150. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
151. Black v. Romano, 471 U.S. 606, 611 (1985).
152. Id. at 612-13.
153. Id. at 613.
154. Id. at 612.
155. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 1206 (West 1983).
156. The barriers and hurdles facing the ex-convict seeking reentry into the community have
been comprehensively chronicled in JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME (2003).
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pushed me," "he's been coming home drunk," "he's selling and using," etc.-easy
to claim, difficult to disprove, and often a ticket back to jail.157 Surely, one small-
and money-saving way-for judges to abate this problem is to impose shorter terms
of probation after prison time has been served. Probation clearly does not stop the
rescidivist; and those who do commit crimes after a shortened term of probation
has expired still will face criminal prosecution.
VII. STORMING THE IVORY TOWER
Regrettably, there are some key players in the criminal justice system who are
unmoved by any demonstration-philosophical or empirical-that an innocent
person can be wrongfully prosecuted and convicted. While the popular slur is that
otherwise competent adults who are out of touch with reality most often reside in
ivory towers located in the Elysian fields of academe, when it comes to contempo-
rary problems of racial injustice, the practitioners of the fanciful are more apt to be
found in our courthouses. Nearly all the studies cited in this article come from
academicians; and sadly, some of the most obtuse and illogical-not to mention
unethical-observations about race, justice, and actual innocence are attributable
to people operating in the "real world." One especially outrageous example of
such an immoral mindset was the subject of a New York Times front page story in
February of 2003. A few lines are worth repeating:
Judge Laura Denvir Stith seemed not to believe what she was hearing. A
prosecutor was trying to block a death row inmate from having his conviction
reopened on the basis of new evidence, and Judge Stith, of the Missouri Supreme
Court, was getting exasperated. "Are you suggesting," she asked the prosecutor,
that "even if we find Mr. Amrine is actually innocent, he should be executed?"
Frank A. Jung, an assistant state attorney general, replied, "That's correct, your
honor."
That exchange was, legal experts say, unusual only for its frankness.
After a trial and appeal, many prosecutors say, new evidence of claimed
innocence should generally not be considered by the courts. 158
The position taken by the Missouri assistant attorney general was a replication
of the one advanced several years earlier by the Virginia Attorney General. In
157. See Gross, supra note 16, at 18. The University of Michigan researchers noted the
frequent occurrence of perjury in the exoneration cases they studied. Conceding the difficulty
of unearthing an intentional falsehood, the authors of the study indicated that the perjury prob-
lem is probably more widespread than their figures show; but nevertheless, they were able to
reach a conclusion that is dispiriting and should prompt caution on the part of all people of good
faith who are entrusted with determining outcomes in a criminal trial: "Overall, in 44% of all
exonerations (145/328) at least one sort of perjury is reported-including 57% of murder exon-
erations (114/199), and 24% of rape exonerations (29/120)." Id. It should be noted that the
researchers encountered perjury by putative victims, actual perpetrators pointing accusing fin-
gers at innocents, complaining witnesses, police officers, and forensic experts. Regarding the
long-standing problem of police perjury, see Gabriel J. Chin & Scott C. Wells, The "Blue Wall of
Silence" as Evidence of Bias and Motive to Lie: A New Approach to Police Perjury, 59 U. Prrr.
L. REV. 233 (1998); Christopher Slobogin, Testilying: Police Perjury and What to Do About It,
67 U. COLO. L. REV. 1037 (1996); and CommentPolice Perjury in Narcotics "Dropsy" Cases:
A New Credibility Gap, 60 GEO. L.J. 507 (1971).
158. Adam Liptak, Prosecutors See Limits to Doubt in Capital Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24,
2003, at Al.
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arguing successfully that a death row inmate, Joseph O'Dell, was time-barred from
having DNA tests submitted to demonstrate his erroneous conviction, Attorney
General Mary Sue Terry, in a widely reported statement, was chillingly succinct:
"Evidence of innocence is irrelevant."'159
Happily for him, Mr. Amrine fared better than Mr. O'Dell. Two months after
hearing argument, the Missouri Supreme Court granted Amrine's habeas corpus
petition, holding that while the evidence on which Amrine was initially convicted
was "constitutionally sufficient," though "not overwhelming," the recanting of three
fellow inmates whose testimony had designated him as the perpetrator of a murder
caused "confidence in his conviction and sentence [to be] so undermined that they
cannot stand and must be set aside." 160
Though no mention is made of it in the opinion, Mr. Amrine, like so many
others whose life is viewed by officialdom as cheap and expendable, was black. 161
In Texas, the nation's execution capital, high ranking government officials, includ-
ing Governor Rick Perry, carried out the death sentences of two men whose con-
victions were thought to have been compromised by intentional deception and the
suppression of evidence, despite Police Chief Harold Hurtt's call for a halt to all
executions until the forensic evidence scandal could be fully investigated. 1
62
Unbridled and unscrupulous prosecutorial zeal countenanced by indifferent
or somnolent judges wrecks lives and causes havoc in the justice system. In 1999,
two investigative journalists for the Chicago Tribune documented the problem:
With impunity, prosecutors across the country have violated their oaths and the
law, committing the worst kinds of deception in the most serious of cases.
They have prosecuted black men, hiding evidence the real killers were white.
They have prosecuted a wife, hiding evidence her husband committed suicide.
They have prosecuted parents, hiding evidence their daughter was killed by wild
dogs. 163
In the first study of its kind, the Chicago Tribune analysis of thousands of
court records, appellate rulings, and lawyer disciplinary records from across the
United States found "[among other things, since 1963,] at least 381 defendants
nationally have had a homicide conviction thrown out because prosecutors con-
cealed evidence suggesting innocence or presented evidence they knew to be
false." 164 "Of the 381 defendants, 67 have been sentenced to death." 165
159. A Google search brings up many sites connecting Attorney General Terry with this
statement, though none was located that contained the exact document or date. For the purpose
of this essay, my reference is to Charles Wilton, "Innocence is Irrelevant," PEACEWORK, April
1999, available at www.AFSC.org/pwork/0499/049906.
160. State ex. rel. Amrine v. Roper, 102 S.W.3d 541, 548-49 (Mo. 2003).
161. Telephone interview by Kara Hoopis, Research Assistant, with James Fletcher, Public
Interest Litigation Clinic, Kansas City, Mo. (Jan. 27, 2005). The Public Interest Litigation Clinic
is the organization that provided legal representation to Mr. Amrine.
162. Robert Crowe, Inmate Executed for 1986 Slaying, HousTroN CHRONICLE, Oct. 7, 2004,
available at http://www.prisonpotpourri.com/EXECUTED/HoustonChronicle-com%20-
%20Condemned%20inmate%20Peter%2Miniel%20executed.html.
163. Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, The Verdict: Dishonor, CHI. TaRn., Jan. 10, 1999,
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The "evidence-of-innocence-is-irrelevant" school of thought unfortunately
draws some support from decisions of the United States Supreme Court, princi-
pally Herrera v. Collins,166 and Dretke v. Haley.167 Writing the opinion of the
Court in Herrera, Chief Justice Rehnquist elevated the art of circumlocution as he
weaved his view that federal habeas corpus is a limited vehicle for state prisoner
claims into a paen celebrating the efficacy and fairness of state criminal trials and
the principal of finality. 168 Along the way, the Chief Justice observed that newly
discovered evidence, unearthed beyond the thirty days after sentence allowed by
Texas procedure for submitting such evidence in support of a new trial motion, is
universally without value. 169 The Chief Justice, like all his colleagues on the
present Supreme Court, never in his days of law practice defended a person ac-
cused of a felony, 170 but had this to say about the utility of exculpatory evidence
discovered months or even years after a claimed erroneous conviction: "[Tihere is
no guarantee that the guilt or innocence determination would be any more exact.
To the contrary, the passage of time only diminishes the reliability of criminal
adjudications."1 7 1
The efforts of Barry Sheck, Professor Gross, and others expose the fatuity of
this remark. Whether the newly discovered evidence is a DNA comparison, a re-
canting by a perjurious witness, the confession of the true perpetrator, or anything
else, fact finders-whether judges or jurors-can evaluate the evidence regardless
of the passage of time. Whatever the difficulties involved in such an undertaking,
they are worth the effort for those who think there is neither justice nor societal
benefit in the continued incarceration of an innocent person.
As if circumlocution was not enough, the Chief Justice urged the abandon-
ment of common sense, finding that Texas was not engaged in conduct offensive to
any constitutional strictures by its refusal to "entertain petitioner's newly discov-
ered evidence eight years after his conviction." 172 He tosses the bone of possible
executive clemency to Herrera, but it is one on which the petitioner surely will
choke. Said Rehnquist: "Clemency is deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradi-
tion of law, and is the historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where
166. 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
167. __ U.S. -, 124 S. Ct. 1847 (2004).
168. 506 U.S. at 401-10.
169. Id. at 403-04.
170. Stephen J. Fortunato, Jr., The Supreme Court's Experience Gap, 82 JUDCATURE 251, 251
(1999). The problem is not simply that the Chief Justice has no background as a criminal de-
fense attorney, or that a handful of the other justices lack such career experience; rather, the
problem is that none of them has any such background (although Justice Souter prosecuted for a
short period of time), even though on an annual basis twenty-five percent of the approximately
ninety cases that go to full decision involve criminal law. Apart from their familiarity with the
dynamic of the criminal trial, the justices' dirth of experience in this field also necessarily means
that they have no contact with the poor, illiterate, disturbed, and addicted individuals who con-
stitute the majority of people accused of crime in the U.S.
171. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. at 403 (citing McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467,491 (1999)).
This view notwithstanding, the law everywhere allows capital prosecutions that are never pro-
scribed by a statute of limitations.
172. Id. at411.
judicial process has been exhausted." 173 Dretke v. Haley1 74 presented an even
starker example of the majority of the United States Supreme Court meandering
timorously across the terrain of actual innocence. Unlike the case of Mr. Herrera,
there were no ambiguities whatsoever relative to Michael Wayne Haley's claim
that he was actually innocent of the crime for which he was sentenced. 175 Haley
had received an enhanced sentence of 161/2 years, having been deemed a habitual
offender; but by the time his appeal reached the United States Supreme Court,
everyone agreed that he did not fit properly under that rubric because at the time of
trial and during the course of his appeal, neither the judge, defense counsel, the
prosecutor, the jury, nor appellate counsel noted that controlling time frames had
been miscalculated to Mr. Haley's detriment. 176 Haley sought immediate release
from his clearly unjust incarceration, but the Supreme Court determined he would
have to languish in his Texas jail cell while an ineffective counsel claim was liti-
gated in the state court. 177
The majority decision provoked a stinging dissent by Mr. Justice Stevens.
After noting that a "congeries of mistakes" was made by the trial judge, the pros-
ecutor, and Haley's attorney, 178 Justice Stevens faulted the state for "[opposing]
the grant of habeas relief in this case, even as it concedes that respondent has
already served more time in prison then the law authorized ..... 179 He concluded
with an observation that should function as a guide in all such cases: "Habeas
corpus is, and has for centuries been, a 'bulwark against convictions that violate
fundamental fairness.' Fundamental fairness should dictate the outcome of this
unusually simple case." 180 Those working to make our criminal justice system
fair for anyone accused of a crime, regardless of color, must note the obvious
obstacles in the persons of lawyers and judges, presumably well-educated in the
liberal arts tradition, who through sophistry and linguistic legerdemain can keep
innocent people in jail or abruptly rebuff claims of those seeking redress based on
newly discovered evidence.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The findings and conclusions of scholars over the past decades regarding crime,
punishment, and rehabilitation, when combined with the recent examination of
wrongful convictions and the resulting exonerations, demonstrate that people of
color are disproportionately harmed by the criminal justice system. Statistics col-
lected and collated by scholars, both within and without the legal profession, prove
that something malevolent rather than random is at work. This is not to suggest
173. Id. at 411-12. For a grim account of how then-Texas Governor George W. Bush cava-
lierly and almost universally rejected every clemency appeal placed on his desk, see Sister Helen
Prejean, Death in Texas, N.Y. REV. OF BOOKS, Jan. 13, 2005, at 4. Sister Prejean's essay in The
New York Review is adapted from her latest book, THE DEATH OF INNOCENTS: AN EYEWITNESS
AccouNT OF WRONGFUL EXECuTIONS (2005).
174. 158 L. Ed. 2d 659 (2004).
175. Id. at 666-67.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 670-71 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 671 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
179. Id. at 672 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
180. Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
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that a large number of law enforcement officials, prosecutors, and judges are en-
gaged in a conspiracy to intentionally railroad individual blacks or to sabotage
black communities, but rather to suggest that the American criminal trial has evolved
over time in such a way that many of its fundamental rules, procedures, and prac-
tices visit fatal disadvantages on all persons facing criminal charges, especially on
people of color.
In this sad picture, a trial judge occupies a crucial position that, when used
effectively and fairly, can ameliorate, if not eliminate, some of the problems that
lead to unjust and racist consequences. Judges can-and in my view, must-take
the leading role in jettisoning the myths, fictions, and misperceptions that infuse
the criminal trial. For example, during the voir dire, judges should be alert to
governmental challenges to minority jurors that have no foundation other than the
prosecutor's hunch or intuition. Judges can also show some fortitude and logic by
excluding evidence of prior convictions unless the defendant who takes the stand
puts his own character in issue by claiming an unblemished record or a disposition
that he would never engage in the kind of activity with which he is accused. Judges
should also adopt the language the United States Supreme Court has used to define
the government's burden of proof in their instructions to juries that a conviction
can be returned only if the evidence has persuaded them to a near certainty that the
defendant committed the crime. Thoughtful and creative judges can do these things
and much more to bring about fairer trials for all defendants and to eliminate the
scourge of racism from the trials of minority defendants.
These are hardly utopian proposals. And they are made at a time in our legal
history when there is no cause to be smug that the Anglo-Saxon criminal trial as
we know it unerringly reaches the correct result. On the contrary, as the exonera-
tion studies show, the outcome of the American criminal trial is often fatally wrong.
Where necessary, judges-either sua sponte or assisted and prodded by attorneys-
must scrap, modify, or recast rules and practices that individually or jointly foreor-
dain outcomes that are either unfair, or racist, or both. This should comport with
any judge's perception of his or her role, which is, after all, to preside over a con-
stitutionally fair trial that acquits the defendant when the government fails to meet
its burden of proof and convicts when it does, and then to impose a sentence that
fits the crime, the criminal, and basic notions of justice and mercy-an old and
honorable idea not to be forgotten.18 1
181. "[D]o justly, [but]... love mercy" Micah 6:8 (King James).
